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TRIBAL IMMUNITY AND TRIBAL COURTS 
Catherine T. Struve t 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the ironies of federal Indian law is that the Supreme Court has 
stripped tribes of many of the positive aspects of governmental authority­
key aspects of  legislative and adjudicative authority, for example-while 
leaving intact a negative power: the power to avoid liability through the 
assertion of sovereign immunity from suit. How, if at all ,  should tribes use 
this power? A blanket assertion of immunity would deny a remedy to those 
with legitimate grievances against tribal governments . Moreover, because 
current doctrine holds that both Congress and the Supreme Court can 
diminish the powers of triba l  governments , an aggressive assertion of tribal 
immunity could endanger tribes by inviting further incursions on their 
sovereignty. This essay argues that tribes should use their immunity as a 
forum-allocation device: Tribes that waive immunity in tribal courts but not 
elsewhere can simultaneously provide redress for valid c laims and 
strengthen tribal court systems. 
My argument proceeds in four parts. In Part II, I summarize relevant 
principles concerning tribal sovereignty in general and tribal sovereign 
immunity in particular, and conclude that tribal immunity has a strong basis 
in Supreme Court precedent. In Part III, I survey caselaw and constitutional 
and statutory provisions from selected tribes; these sources indicate that 
many Indian nations currently provide significant remedies, in tribal court, 
for c laims alleging misconduct by tribal governments . Not a l l  tribes 
provide a full array of remedies for government action; but lest that fact be 
taken out of context, I briefly review, in Part IV, the current landscape of 
remedies against nontriba l  governments. Part IV notes that although the 
federal and state governments have increased the availability of remedies 
t Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to Robert 
Clinton and Louise Weinberg for organizing the panel at which this paper was presented, to my 
fellow panelists-Robert Clinton, Frank Pommersheim, and Judith Resnik-for illuminating 
discussions of related issues, and to Matthew Adler, Frank Goodman and Judith Resnik for 
extremely helpful comments on prior drafts. I thank Richard Horvath and Marianne Staniunas 
for research assistance, and Ronald Day for his help in obtaining source materials. Remaining 
errors, of course, are mine. 
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against government defendants, the remedies still are far from complete. In 
Part Y, I argue that the justifications for tribal sovereign immunity are in 
key respects stronger than those for state sovereign immunity. Ultimately, 
however, tribes will face pressure to waive immunity. I contend that tribal 
waivers of immunity from suit in tribal courts can both provide redress to 
those with legitimate claims and refute the contentions of those who 
disparage the independence and competence of tribal courts. To assist 
tribes in expanding the availability of tribal-court remedies against tribal 
governments, the federal government should increase its funding for tribal 
court systems. In addition, some tribes may wish to consider pooling their 
judicial resources, through structures such as intertribal courts of appeals. I 
concludc by considering the probable effect of the course I advocate. The 
Supreme Court might discount tribal efforts to provide fair remedies in 
tribal courts, but some members of Congress may give weight to those 
endeavors. This likelihood underscores the importance of the Court's 
decision to defer to Congress on questions of tribal immunity. 
II. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS 
Tribal sovereign immunity is comprehensible only as an aspect of tribal 
sovereignty more generally. Thus, Pm1 II.A. discusses general precepts of 
Indian tribal sovereignty and summarizes key events in the history of 
United States-tribal relations. Having thus laid the doctrinal groundwork, I 
will turn, in Part II.B., to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity in 
particular. 
A. Tribal Sovereignty 
The relevant history is well established, but at the risk of repeating the 
work of many other commentators, I will briefly review some key points 
concerning tribal sovereignty and the inroads made upon it by the federal 
government. 
Prior to European contact, Indian tribes exercised full sovercign 
authority; I after contact, the European powers dealt with the tribes by 
1 .  See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542-43 (1832) ("America, separated from 
Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, 
independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and 
governing themselves by their own laws."). This is not to say that tribal governments prior to 
European contact reflected European ideas of nationhood. William McLoughlin, discussing the 
Cherokees, wrote: 
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means of treaties .2 The young United States continued the practice of 
treating tribes as sovereigns, negotiating and entering into treaties with them 
until 187l. 3 In substance, the federal and state governments ' treatment of 
Indian nations sometimes ranged from the unfair to the genocidal . During 
the early nineteenth century, for example ,  nOD-Indians used pressure tactics 
and violence in their efforts to obtain tribal lands, and the federal 
government u ltimately pressed on the southeastern tribes the policy of  
"removal" from the tribes ' homelands to lands west of the Mississippi .4 I t  
was a brutal policy; when the last Cherokees east of the Mississippi moved 
west along the Trai l  of Tears,s the conditions before, during and after the 
journey were so harsh that some 4,000 of  them died.6 In form, however, the 
The term "nation" was first g iven to Indian peoples by the Europeans. 
Prior to the eighteenth century, the Cherokees, l ike most tribes, had a highly 
decentral ized pol itical system in whic h  local or town chiefs and councils 
made most of the political decisions. For their o\vn reasons, the Europeans 
tried to force the tribes into nationalist centralization under one chief . . .  , one 
counc i l, one process of majority rule .  
WILLIAM G .  McLOllGHLlN, AFTER THE TRAIL Of TE.WS: TilE CHEROKE ES' STRuGGLE FOR 
SOVEREIGNTY, 1 839- 1 8 80, at 6 ( 1 993). 
2. VIN E DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERIC.\N I NDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 3 
( 1 983); DAVID E .  WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMA WAIM!\, UN E V EN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 26-36 (200 l); Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition und 
Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federol Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative 
Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 66 I, 
684-85 (2002). 
3. Judith Resnik has noted that "Indian tribes . . .  seem to be recognized [in the 
Constihltion] as h aving a status outside its parameters. Indian tribes are treated as entities with 
whom to have commerce and to make treaties. The tribes also seem to be freed from the taxing 
power of either the state or federal governments." Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: 
Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV . 67 1 ,  69 1 ( 1 989). Thus, "one 
might describe the relationship between the Indian tribes and the United States as that between 
two sovereigns, and locate the relevant legal discourse as that of international law." Id. 
4.  As Russe l l  Thornton explains: 
It is estimated that as many as 1 00,000 AmericaIl Indians were removed 
from eastern homelands to west of the Mi�"issippi River during the first half 
of the nineteenth century; this may even be an underestimation. Most of the 
total  number were members of five tribes: Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, 
Creek, and Seminole, along with remnants of other southeastern Indian 
groups. 
Russell  Thornton, The Demography of the Trail of Tears Period: A New Estimate of Cherokee 
Population Losses, in CHEROKEE REMOVAL: BEfORE AND AFTER 75 (Wil l iam L. Anderson ed., 
1 991) (citation omitted). 
5. A few Cherokees managed to avoid removal . See John R. Finger, The Impact of 
Removal on the North Carolina Cherokees, in CHEROKEE REMOVAL: BEFORE AND AFTER 96, 
105-06 (Wil l iam L. Anderson ed. , 1 991 ) (est imating "a total of about 1 ,400 who avoided 
removal"). 
6. As Gary Moulton has recounted, 
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federal government treated the tribes as  sovereign entities . Thus, for 
example, the removal of  the southeastern tribes occurred pursuant to 
"treaties" purportedly entered into by those tribes . ; 
In a famous tri logy of cases decided pri or to the Cherokee removal, the 
Marshall Court had discussed the status of Indian nations as sovere ign 
governments .  In Johnson v .  M'Intosh,8 the Court held that the United States 
had inherited from the European colonial powers the sole right to acquire 
land held by the Indian nations and to grant fee title to that land.9 The Court 
reasoned that the European "discovery" of the Americas l imited the Indian 
nations ' abi l ity to alienate their own lands: "their rights to comp lete 
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their 
power to dispose of the soil  at their own wi l l ,  to whomsoever they p leased, 
was denied by the original fundamental principle ,  that discovery gave 
exclusive title to those who made it ."IO The Court recognized some 
No accurate figures ex ist for the number who died as a result o f  this 
tragic trek. . . .  Some put the death toll at sixteen hundred. When added to 
the number who fell victim to the harsh encampments before removal and the 
many who sliccumbed to the debilitating circumstances after arrival, nearly 
four thousand Cherokees-or a quarter of the tribe-were lost in the process. 
GARY E. MOULTON. JOHN Ross, CH EROKE E  CHIEF 100 (1978); see also McLOUGHLIN, supra 
note I, at 7 (estimating that "the total number of Cherokee deaths during the removal process 
[was] at least 4,000"). But see Thornton, supra note 4, at 86, 93 (arguing that "[a] total 
[Cherokee] mortality figure of 8,000 for the Trail of Tears pe riod . .  , may not be at all 
unreasonable ," and--after assessing the effects of the Cherokee removal by considering 
estimated rates of " fert i lity and migration as well as 1110rtality"-concluding that "[o]ver 10,000 
additional Cherokees would have been alive sometime during: the period 1835 to 1840 had 
Cherokee removal not occurred"). The removal of other tribes also caused great su ffering; 
Russell Thornton notes that the conventional estimates of 4,000 Cherokee dead "would place 
Cherokee mortality about midway in the mortality losses of the other four major southeastern 
tribes, as well as can now be ascertained." ld. at 85 (discussing mortality rates for Choctaws. 
Chickasaws, Creeks and Seminoles). 
7 .  Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Suprell/ocy Clouse/or Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 113, 120--21 (2002) (discussing treaties concerning removal). 
Whik Congress debated and narrowly passed the Removal Act of 1830, 
establi:o;hing as n at iona l policy the removal of uib-:s from ex isting state 
boundaries to west of the Miss issippi River. both the t(:X[ and the surrounding 
legislative history clearly reflect the view that Congress had no authority 
under the Constitution to unilaterally impose this result on the Indian tribes. 
ld. at 136_ Some "treaties" were concluded with groups whose authority to act on b ehalf of the 
relevant tribe was highly questionable .  Thus, for example, the Treaty of New Echota, by which 
the Cherokee Nation purportedly agreed to removal, was negotiated and entered into by only a 
fraction of the tribe, and was promptly denounced by the Cherokee National Council and by 
John Ross, who called the Treaty "a fraud upon the C herokee people." See FRANCIS PAUL 
PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 179 (1994). 
8. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
9. Id. at 587-89. 
1 0. Id. at 574. 
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difficulties with this proposition, but held that "[ c ] onquest gives a title 
which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and 
speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice o f  
the claim . . . .  "J 1 However, the Court made c lear that the United States 
only had the right to regulate the transfer of triba l  lands to non-Indians; this 
federal power did not alter the tribes '  right to possess the lands . 12 
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, J3 the Cherokee Nation invoked the 
Supreme Court ' s  original jurisdiction, seeking an injunction to restrain the 
state of Georgia and state officials from enforcing Georgia law within the 
Cherokee Nation ' s  territory. 14 The Court disc laimed jurisdiction to hear the 
c laim, reasoning that the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign state" for 
purposes of  Article Ill's grant of federal court subject m atter jurisdiction 
over "Controvers ies . . . between a State . . . and fore ign states ."J5 This 
conclus ion in no way imp lied that the Nation lacked sovereignty; to the 
contrary, Chief Justice Marshall  expressly recognized "the character of  the 
Cherokees as a state , as a distinct pol it ical society, separated from others, 
capable  of managing its own affairs and governing itsclf.,,16 Referring to 
the history of federal relat ions w ith the Cherokees, Marshal l observed that 
"[t]he acts of our government p lainly recognise the Cherokee nation as a 
state , and the Courts are bound by those acts . ,,
17 However, Marshall 
reasoned that the tribes werc under the "protection" of the United States, 
such that "any attempt to acquire their lands , or to form a polit ical 
connexion with them, would be cons idered by al l  as an invasion of our 
territory., , 1 8  Marshal l argued that this relationship-which he analogized to 
"that of a ward to his  guardian"-rendered the tribes "domestic dependent 
nations ."J9 But despite this v iew of the United States' protective role vis-a­
vis the Cherokees , Nlarshall concluded, "If it be true that the Cherokee 
11. Jd at 5SS. 
12. Id. at 603 (""It has never been contended , that the Indian titk amounted to nothing . 
Their right of possession ha:> never been questioned."). 
13. 30 U.S .  1 (IS3 1 ) . 
14. Jd at 15. 
15. fd at 20; U.S. CONST. art. I I I ,  § 2. Justices Thompson and Story, by contrast, bel ieved 
that the Nation did come within the definition of "foreign States." See Cherokee Nation, 30 
U.S .  at 68-69 (Thompson, 1., joined by Story, 1., dissenting). 
1 6 . Jd at 16. 
17. Jd 
I S. Jdat 1 7- 1 S. 
1 9 .  Jd. at 17. A s  Robert Cl inton has pointed out, "dependence for Chief Justice Marshal l 
was not a source of federal authority over the Cherokee Nation. Rather, i t  constituted a 
description of a relationship created by treaty in which the federal government owed the 
Cherokee certain obligations of protection." Clinton, supra note 7, at 141. 
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nation have rights , this is  not  the tribunal in which those rights are to be 
asserted. ,,20 
The fol lowing year, Georgia's incarceration of a white missionary 
named Samuel Worcester brought the question of Georgia ' s  power in 
Cherokee territory back before the Court, and this time thc Court exercised 
jurisdiction.2 I Worcester had been convicted in  Georgia  state court of 
"residing within the l imits of the Cherokee nation without a l icense," in 
violation of purported Georgia law, and had been sentenced to four years 
hard labor.22 The Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that 
the Georgia statute on which it was based violated federal law.23 Chief 
Justice Marshal l ,  writing for the Court, centered his reasoning on the 
principle that relations with the Indian nat ions were the sole prerogative of 
the federal government, to the exclusion of the states . 24 I n  the process, 
Marshal l  made c lear that the relationship between the tribes and the federal 
government did not strip the tribes of their sovereign character. "This 
relation," Marshall  stated, "was that of a nation claiming and receiving the 
protection of one more powerful :  not that of individuals abandoning their 
national character, and submitt ing as subjects to the laws of a master. , ,25 
This view of the Indian nations as retaining sovereignty-except with 
respect to foreign relations and land cession-was reflected in federal treaty 
and l egislative practice through most of the n ineteenth century. A recent 
survey of federal legis lation up to 1885 found only one statute "that 
purported to directly govern any Indian in Indian country. ,,26 Even this 
statute-whi ch app lied federal criminal law to certain crimes within I ndian 
territory-appl ied to Indians only "when they harmed the person or 
property of anyone subject to the protection of the United States and then 
only when the offender's tribe refused to punish them or otherwise resolve 
20. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20 .  
21. In addition to Worcester, others had been tried and convicted for similar "crimes." See 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 US. 515,531-32 (1832). Elizur BUller, i:lnother miss i onary, see 
Douglas C. Wilms, Cherokee rUlid Use il7 Georgia Be/ore Remo\'C/f, ill CHEROKEE REMOV!\L: 
BEFORE AND AFTER I, 9 (William L. Anderson ed., 1991), also sought review in the Supreme 
Court, see Worcester, 31 U.S. at 534, and the Supreme Court reversed his convict i on as well as 
Worcester's, see id. a� 597 . 
22 .  Worcester, 31 U .S. at 537, 540 .  The charges against Worcester also included the 
assertion that he had not "taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and laws of the 
state of Georgia." Id. at 537. 
23. Id. at 561-63. 
24. Id. at 557 .  
25 .  Id. a t  5 5 5 .  
26.  Clinton, supra note 7, at 1 35 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1 8 1 7 , ch. 92,  3 Stat. 383; Act of 
June 30, 1 834, ch. 1 6 1 ,  § 25 ,  4 Stat. 729; Act of Mar. 27 , 1 854, ch. 27 ,  § §  3-6, 10 Stat. 269, 270 
(codified as amended at 18 U.s.c. § 1 152)) . 
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the matter. , ,27 The federal government continued to deal with Indian 
nations by means of treaties unt i l  1871, when a power struggle between the 
House and Senate led to the inclusion, in an appropriations b i l l ,  of language· 
stating that the United States would no longer enter into treaties with Indian 
tribes.28 For some decades after that, the federal government continued to 
negotiate with tribes concerning proposed federal legis lat ion affecting tribal 
interests .29 
Near the end of the nineteenth century, however, the tide turned against 
tribal sovereignty, as the federal government asserted regulatory authority 
over tribe members and adopted the policy of a l lotment of tribal land. The 
enactment of the Maj or Crimes Act30 in 1885 marked the first significant 
assertion of federal legislative jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country?! 
In upholding the Act against constitutional challenge, the Court in United 
States v. Kagama32 conceded that the Constitution itself provided no basis 
for such an exercise of  federal authority.33 Rather, the Court asserted that 
the federal government ' s  "duty of protection" to the tribes gave the United 
States power to regulate the tribes.34 Robert Cl inton has highl ighted the 
perversity of this assert ion: "The very trusteeship that Chief Just ice 
Marshal l  suggested in Cherokee Nation implemented the treaty-based 
federal obligation to protect Cherokee sovereignty and territorial integrity 
was employed in Kagama as a source of federal authority to attack tribal 
sovereignty. ,,35 
Despite this fundamental probl em in its reasoning, Kagama was cited 
thenceforward as authority for the federal government ' s  p lenary power with 
respect to Indian tribes;36 and Congress lost l ittl e  time in exercising its 
purported authority. The year after the Court decided Kagama, Congress 
passed the General A l lotment Act of 1887?7 This statute , by directing the 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 167-68 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 
U.S.c. § 71); see also Steven Paul McSloy , The "Miner's CanOlY:" .4 Bire/'s Eye View oj 
American Indion Law and Irs Future, 37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 733, 735 (2003). 
29. See Clinton, supra llote; 7, at \68-69. 
30. Act of Mar. 3,1885, ch. 341, � 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (codified as amended at 18 lJS.C. 
, 11 -"' ) � ).) . 
3 J. See Clinton, supra note 7, at 170. 
32. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
33. Id. at 378-79. 
34. Id. at 384. 
35. Clinton,supranote 7, at 1 75. 
36. Id. at 177-78. 
37. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 
U.s.c. §§ 334, 339, 341-42, 348, 349, 354, 381 (2000)). The allotment era ended with the 
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. See injra notes 42-44 and accompanying 
text. 
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a l lotment of tribal lands to individual Indians, aimed both to make Indian 
lands avail able to whites and to weaken existing tribal governments. 38 Even 
where tribes asserted that the federal a l lotment efforts violated existing 
treaty r ights and the Fifth Amendment, the Court refused to grant rel ief. 
Thus, in 1903 , the Court held in  Lone vVo(f v. Hitchcock39 that the federal 
government ' s  trust relationship with the tribes empowered the United States 
uni latera l ly to override (by statute) its treaty agreements with the tribes .4o 
The trust relationship, moreover, required the Court to "presume that 
Congress acted in perfect good faith"  in its dealings with the tribes; i f  
Congress had wronged the tribes, i t  was from Congress-not the Court­
that they must seek rel ief.4 1 
In  the 1 930s, after i t  had become c lear that federal policy had produced 
widespread poveliy and misery on Indian reservations, the New Deal 
Congress ended the al lotment era. 42 In the Indian Reorganization Act of  
1 93 4 ,43 Congress not only put  a stop to  allotment, but also imposed 
restrictions on the transfer of tribal land and encouraged the formal ization 
o f  tribal governments .44 Federal support for Indian self-government waned 
at mid-century, however, and the l ate 1940s and the 1 95 0s saw a number of 
federal efforts to terminate the existence of tribal governments .45 The 
pendulum began to swing back once again in the 1 960s, with the adoption 
of Great Society init iatives that inc luded Native Americans with in their 
scope .46 Tn a 1970 message to Congress, President Nixon repudiated the 
termination policy and announced an era of Indian self-determination in 
which the tribes would have input into federal policies affecting thcm .47 
38 .  See Clinton, supra note 7,  at 179 (noting that the Act "sought to break down tribal 
cohesion and the authority of traditional tribal leaders by changing the Indian land tcnure 
system from communal tribal ownership to individually-owned allotments" and that it "opencd 
Indi an reservations to non-Indian settlement for the first time"); DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 
2,  at 9-10. 
39 .  187 U.S. 5 5 3  ( 1 903) .  
40. Id <1 \  500. 
41 . fd at 56�; see Joseph Wi lliam S inger, Lone Wolf, {)J" lfuw to Take ProperlY by Coffing 
It a "Mere Change in the Form of Investment," 38 TCl.SA L. REV. 37, 39 (2002) (arguing that 
"Lone Wall was a travesty, not only because it  plac ed Indians beyond the reach of the 
Constitution, but alsp because it leg i t imated both an act of conquest and what is probably the 
most massive uncompensated taking of property in Un ited S tates hi story"). 
42 . See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 2, at 12- 1 5 .  
43 .  Act of June 1 8 , 1 934, 48 Stat. 984,  ch. 5 76 (codified as  amended a t  2 5  U.S .c .  §§  46 1 ,  
462, 463 , 464, 465, 466-70, 47 1 , 472,473, 474, 475 , 476-78 & 479 (2000» . 
44 . DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 2 ,  at 1 4 . 
45 .  Jd. at 1 5-2 l .  
46. Jd. a t  22 .  
47. See President Nixon, Speci al Message on Indian Affairs (July 8, 1 970), reprinted in 
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 256-58 (3d ed. ,  Francis Paul Prucha ed . ,  2000). 
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Federal legislative and executive branch support for tribal self­
determination and self-government has remained relatively constant since 
then. 48 
At the same time that the political branches were becoming more 
sympathetic to tribal interests , concerns also arose with respect to the rights 
of individual Indians vis-a-vis tribal governments. Noting that those 
governments are not bound by the F i fth or Fourteenth Amendments , 
Congress in  1 968 passed the Indian Civi l  Rights Act ("ICRA"),49 which 
applies to tribal governments constraints similar to those found in the Bil l  of 
Rights and the Equal Protection Clause. The ICRA provis ions are not 
identical to those in the B il l  of Rights; for example,  the ICRA does not 
inc lude an Estab l ishment C lause .
50 In addition, the ICRA creates no 
expl ic i t  cause of action enforceable  in  federal court, except for habeas 
corpus review for individuals in tribal custody. 51 In Santa Clara Pueblo v .  
iViartinez,52 the Supreme Court refused to imply any additional right of  
action in federal comi; the Court held that Congress intended that-outside 
the habeas context-rel ief under the ICRA should be sought from the tribe 
and not from federal courtS .53 lviartinez, l ike the ICRA itself, can be seen as 
a compromi se between the interests of civi l  rights c la imants and the 
interests of tribes: the Court upheld the ICRA as a valid exercise of p lenary 
federa l power over the tribes,54 but directed most ICRA c laimants to seek 
re l ief only from the tribes themselves. 55 
More generally, during most of the twentieth century the doctrine of 
Congress ' s  p lenary power over Indian tribes had two effects on the 
adj udication of tribal rights: i t  often led the courts to deny j udic ia l  remedies 
for harms inflicted by the federal government, but i t  also restra ined the 
courts from diminishing tribal  powers in the absence of congress ional 
48. See Seielstad, supra note 2 ,  at 753 ("Since 1968, virtual ly  every president ia l  
administration, regardless of pol itical affil i at ion,  has  confinned i t s  commitment to  tribal 
sovereignty, i ncluding the development of trihal economies and means of sel f-guvernancc.''). 
4lJ. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 20 1-70 1 ,  82 Stat. 73, 77-8 1 ( 1 968) (codified a:i amended at 2.5 
USc. �� 1301-41 (2000)). 
50. In some respects, the ICRA constra ints are more restrict ive than the Bill of Rights. 
See Clinton,  supra note 7, at 199 (noting that "the ICRA goes beyond the B il l  of R ights by 
purporting to l imit tribal  court sentenc ing powers to a one-year tenn of imprisonment or a 
$5 ,000 fine"). 
51. See 25 U .s.c. § 1303 ("The privi lege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be avai lab le to 
any person, in a court of the U nited States, to test the l egality of his detention by order of an 
Indian tribe.") .  
5 2 .  436  U . S .  49 ( 1 978). 
5 3 .  See id. a t  59 ,  7l. 
54 .  See id. at 56-57 .  
55 .  See id at 65-66. 
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action . Tee-Hit- Ton Indians v. United States56 dramatically i l lustrates the 
first of these effects : in Tee-Hit- Ton, the Court held that if a tribe did not 
have treaty-recognized title, federal action depriving the tribe of its lands 
did not give rise to a takings c laim.57 Astonishingly, the Court derived this 
principle from Johnson v. M'Intosh, a case which-as discussed above­
had affirmed Indian nations ' right to possess their  lands .58  In Tee-Hit- Ton, 
as in a number of other cases, the Court relegated tribal claims to the 
mercies of  the polit ical branches: as the Court explained, i ts decision 
" leaves with Congress , where i t  belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities [sic] 
for the termination of Indian occupancy . . . rather than making 
compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle."s9 
On the other hand, though the Court was often unwil l ing to invalidate 
the polit ical branches '  po licies concerning Indian nations� i t  did not act 
independently of those branches to reduce tribal powers. Rather, it applied 
canons of constnlction that served to minimize the harm that flowed from 
the policies adopted by the pol it ical  branches.6o As Phi l ip Frickey has 
explained, "although Congress had the authority to destroy Indian rights, 
the assumption was that Congress would not do so l ightly, and thus canons 
of interpretation protecting tribal interests were app lied to statutory as wel l  
. . ,,61 as treaty mterpretatlOn.  
During the past quarter-century, however, the Court has deviated from 
those canons and has created a number of  new federal common law 
limitations on tribal  sovereignty .62 It has held that tribes lack the power to 
56 .  348 U. S .  272 (1955) .  
57 . Id. at 2 85 ; see Bryan H.  W ildenthal, Fighting the Lone Wolf lv!clltolity: Twenzy-First 
Cemwy Reflections on the Paradoxical State of A merican Indian Loll', 38 TULSA L .  REV. 113, 
1 1 9-22 (2002) (criti c izing Tee-Hit-Ton). 
5 8 .  Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S .  at 2 84-85; see N e l l  Jessup Newton, Federal Power over 
Indialls: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 1 32 U. PA. L. REv. 195,248 ( 1984) ("[1]11 relying 
un thc Doctrine of Discovery to justify the resul t  [in Tee-Hit-Toll]' the Court expanded that 
doctrine from a doctrine protcctive of aboriginal land rights to une permitting arbitrary 
confiscation without payment of compensation."). 
59. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 290-9 1 .  
60. Philip P. , Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism .' The Judicial 
Divestiture of Jndi�lI7 Tribal A uthoriry over Nonmembers, 1 09 YALE L .J .  1 ,  1 2  ( 1 999) ;  cf 
Cl inton , supra note 7, at 178 (noting, with respect to late-nineteenth century Supreme Court 
decisions, that "while the Court was rhetorically staking out broad claims of authority for 
Congress, it was not, in  fact, aggressively construing federal statutes i n  a fashion that interfered 
with tribal sovereignty"). 
61. See Frickey, supra note 60, at 12 . 
62 . See Joseph William S inger, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's A ttack on 
Tribal Sovereignry, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 647-53 (2003) (critic izing Court 's  recent 
reductions of tribal  sovereignty) .  
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prosecute non-members for criminal offenses63 and that tribes generally 
lack authority to regulate non-Indians ' hunting and fishing on non-Indian­
owned lands within a reservation,64 to regulate zoning of such lands,65 to tax 
activities c�nducted by nonmembers on such lands,66 or to exercise 
legislative or adjudicative jurisdiction over many disputes involving non­
tribe members that arise within reservation boundaries. 67 These l imitations 
conflict with current congressional and executive branch policy: as Robert 
C linton points out, "what the Court has sought to do over the past quarter 
century is to continue the jurisdictional assault on tribalism and tribal 
sovereignty undertaken m the General Allotment Act of 1 8 87 , 
63. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U .S .  676, 679 (1990) (holding that tribes lacked criminal 
jurisdiction over non-member Indians); Oliphant v .  Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U .S .  191, 195 
(1978) (ho lding that tribal courts lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians). Congress 
responded to the Court's decision in Duro by enacting legislation (known as the "Duro fix") 
that "recogn ize[ s] and affirm[ s]" tribes' "inherent power .. . to exerc ise criminal j urisdietion 
over a l l  Ind ians." Pub. L. No. 10 1 -511, § 8077,  104 Stat. 1856, 1892-93 (1990) (currently 
codified at 25 U.s.c. § 13 0 1 (2»; see also Pub. L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (199 1 )  (making 
the Duro fix legislation permanent). This Tenn, the Court has before it United States v. Loro, a 
case that pr�sents questions relating to the effect of the Duro fix .  See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Uni ted States v. Lara (No. 03 - 1 07) , available (j{ 
http ://www.sLlpremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ tr,mscripts/03 - 1 07 .pdf ( last visi ted 
March 14, 2004); see also Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wors, und the Federal Courts: The JV1.vths and 
the Methods o[Marbury v. Madison, 36 ARIZ. ST.  L.J. 77 .  121 (2004) (discussing Laro). 
64. Montana v. United States, 450  U . S .  544, 557 (1981) (holding that the Crow Tribe 
lacked the "power . . . to regulate non-Indian fish ing and hunting on reservation land owned in 
fee by nonmembers of the Tribe") . 
65 .  Brenda1e v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U . S .  408. 
4 1 4, 432-3 3 ( 1 989) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., 
announcing judgment of Court as to one set of land and d issenting from disposition as to other 
set of land) (concluding that the Yakima Nation lacked "the authority to zone fee lands owned 
by nonmembers of the Tribe located within the boundaries of the Yakima Reservation"); id at 
444 (Stevens . . r  . . joined by O'Connor, J., concurring ill juJgmC:J1t as to onc sct of land and 
announcing j uJgmcIlt \.J r Court as to o ther set o f  lane!) (cone I ud ing that the Nation had a llthNi ty 
to zone fee: lands o\,vned by nonmembers within an area of the reservation that was generally 
closed to the pub l ic) .  
66. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S .  645,  647 (200 1 )  (holding that tribes 
general l y  lack authority "to tax nonmember activity occurring on  non-Indian fee land" within 
reservation) . 
67. Nevada v .  H icks, 533 U.S .  3 5 3 ,  355 , 374 (200 1 )  (holding that tribal court lacked 
"jurisdiction over civi l  claims against state officials who entered tribal  land to execute a search 
warrant against a tribe member suspected of having violated state law outside the reservation"); 
Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U . S .  438 ,  442 (1997) (holding that "triba l  courts may not 
entertain claims against nonmembers arising out of accidents on state highways, absent a statute 
or treaty authorizing the tribe to govern the conduct of nonmembers on the h ighway in 
question"). 
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notwithstanding subsequent express repudiation of that pol icy by the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1 934 . , ,68 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, then, Indian nations have a 
complex relationship with the United States .  The pol itical branches of  the 
federal government now support tribal self-determination and self­
government, but the Supreme Court, by contrast, has p laced i ncreasing 
limitations on tribal powers.69 It is against this background that the doctrine 
of tribal  sovereign immunity must be considered . 
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
The Supreme Court has long viewed sovereign immunity as a bas ic 
feature of tribal sovereignty. Current doctrine holds that tribal sovereign 
immunity, l ike other aspects of tribal authority, can be abrogated by 
Congress;70 but until Congress acts, triba l  sovereign immunity remains.  
Although judicial acknowledgment of tri ba l  sovereignty dates back at 
least to the M arsha l l  Tri logy, commentators (and the Court itself) have 
assumed that the Supreme Court did not spec i fically recognize tribal 
sovereign immunity unti l  1 9 1 9  at the ear l iest . 7 1  H owever, the Court ' s  1 850  
decision in Parks v. ROSS72 displays reasoning strikingly s imilar to that 
found in sovereign immunity doctrine.  The case arose from the logistical 
detai ls of the Cherokee removal, along the Trail of  Tears, to lands west of 
the Mississippi . 73 John Ross-the Cherokee pol itical leader who had 
brought the C herokee Nation' s  case against Georgia in the Supreme Court 
68.  Clinton, ,wpm note 7 ,  at  2 1 3 .  
69. See Cl inton, slIpra note 7,  at 1 1 7 ("[B]eginning in the late twentieth century, the 
Supreme COLll1 has arrogated to itself the p lenary power it previously rationalized for Congress 
and has begun dcfin ing federal Indian law in an exercise of j ud ic ial p lenary power, s im i larly 
without any lawful  j ustification ."). 
70. Okla. Tax Comm'n  v .  Citizen B and Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S .  50.5 . 
.509 ( 1 99 1 ) . 
7 1 .  See , e.g , Ki o\\'J Tribe of  Ok la ,  v. Mfg.  Techs . . [ ilC . •  .523 U . S .  7 .5 1 ,  7.56 ( 1 998)  ("The 
doc trine is said by some of our own opinions to rest on the Court 's opinion in  Tlirner v. United 
Stales, 248 U . S .  3 5 4  . . .  ( 1 9 1 9) .") ;  David B .  Jordan, Note, Federal Indian Law: Tribal 
Sovereign {/ilI/llIlI ity' ':'Vhy Oklahoma Businesses Should Revalllp Legal Relationships with 
Indian Tribes after Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc . ,  52 OKLA. L. REv . 489 , 
490 ( 1 999) ("The first judicial recogn ition of sovereign immunity i n  Indian law occurred in 
1 9 1 9  in Turner v. United States. ") . As the Court noted in United States v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co. , 309 U.S .  506, 5 1 2  ( 1 940), the E ighth Circuit had expl ic itly recognized tribal 
sovereign immunity as early as 1 895,  in Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66 F. 3 7 2  (8th Cir. 
1 895) .  
72 .  52 U.S.  ( 1 1 How.) 362 ( 1 850) .  
7 3 .  I a m  indebted to Gary Moulton for h i s  graciousness in  d iscussing with m e  the factual 
background to Farks v. Ross. 
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in 1 83 1 74-had opposed removal,7 5 but once i t  became clear that removal 
was inevitable, Ross became the Nation ' s  superintendent for the j ourney. 76 
Four of the many wagons requi red for the move were h ired from Sanluel 
Parks , a Cherokee citizen.77 Samuel Parks apparently died before he could 
receive the balance due on the transaction, and in 1 84 1 , Ross settled the 
account by paying $ 1 ,2 80 to George Parks, the administrator of Samuel ' s  
estate .78 A couple of  years later, Parks , a s  administrator, sued Ross i n  the 
Circuit Court of  the United States for the District of  Co lumb ia , seeking an 
additional sum with respect to the transaction.79 The trial court granted a 
directed verdict to Ross, and Parks sought review in the Supreme Court . 80 
In his argument to the Court, P arks apparently compl ained that the trial 
court had en-ed by view ing the case as one concerning governmental 
l i ab i l i ty :  the en-or, according to Parks , was that the court below "treated 
[Ross] as the head or executive of a fore ign and independent nat ion, and 
he ld that, having received the money as such, he was responsib le  to the 
nation , and could not, jure gentium, be personally liable . , ,8 1 
The Supreme Court fol lowed the lower court ' s  l ead. In  affirming the 
grant of the d irected verdict , the Court could have re l i ed sole ly on princ ip les 
of agency law, but i t  chose to i nvoke broader concepts of governmental 
ob l igations as wel l :  
[A]n agent who contracts in the name of h i s  principal  i s  not  l i able 
to a suit o n  such contract;  much less a public office r, acting for his 
government. As regards him the rule is,  that he i s  not responsib le  
on any contract he may make i n  that c apacity;  and wherever h is  
contract o r  engagem ent is  con nected with  a subj e c t  fa i rly within  
the scope of his  authority , i t  sh a l l  be  i ntended to have been made 
official ly ,  and in his pub l ic character, unless the contrary appears 
by satisfactory evidence of an absolute and unq ual i fi ed 
engagement to be person al ly  l i a b l e .82 
74. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgi :! ,  30 u.S. (5 Pet . )  1 , 2-3 ( 1 3 3 1 ) 
75. Sec Walter H .  Conser, Jr. , John Ross and the Cherokee Resistance Campaign. 1833-
1838, 44 J. S. HIST. 1 9 1 ,  1 93 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  
7 6 .  See MOULTON, supra note 6, at  9 7 ;  STANLEY W. HOIG,  Ti l E  CHEROKEES AND TI lE IR  
CHIEFS: IN THE WAKE OF EMPIRE 1 69 ( 1 99 8 ) .  
7 7 .  See Parks, 52 U .S .  a t  3 6 3 .  
78 .  See id at  3 64. 
79.  Jd at 374 .  Specifical ly,  Parks contended that the Nation had rece ived money from the 
U.S.  to pay for the return of the wagons to the east, and that the estate was entitled to a share of 
that money. Jd 
80.  Jd at 365,  372-7 3 .  
8 1 .  Jd at 368-69. 
82 .  Jd at 374 .  
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The Court emphasized that " [t]he Cherokees are in  many respects a foreign 
and independent nation. . . . governed by their own laws and officers, 
chosen by themselves. , ,83 The c losing sentence of the Court ' s  discussion 
suggests that, ultimately, the Court 's affinnance rested on the view th,!-t the 
court be low lacked jurisdiction to hear the c laim against Ross :  
[T]his  government has delegated no power t o  the courts of this 
District to arrest the public representatives or  agents of Indian 
nations, who may be casually within their local jurisdiction, and 
compel them to pay the debts of their nation, either to an 
individual of their own nation, or a c it izen of the United States.84 
The Parks Court ' s  treatment of the c laim against Ross fits wel l  with David 
Curri e ' s  synthesis of some of the Court's nineteenth-century decisions 
concerning suits against state or federal official s :  
Under traditional agency principles, an agent i s  l iable for h i s  own 
tol1S (as in Osborn, Lee, and the Virginia Coupon Cases), even 
though committed in the course of h is emp loyment; but he is not 
liable for breach of h i s  empl oyer ' s  contracts (as in Jumef), to 
which he is not a party . 85 
Although the Court 's 1 9 1 9  decision in Turner v. United States86 
exp l ic itly mentioned "the immunity of a sovereign to suit , , ,S7 the Turner 
Court arguably placed less rel iance on notions of sovereign immunity than 
the Parks Court had. In the late nineteenth century, the Creek Nation 
83 . Id. 
84. Id. Adm i tted ly , the Court 's  reasoning was somewhat inconsi s tent : if  the C ourt 
concluded that the court below lac ked jurisd ic t ion to hear the claim agains t  Ross , techn ical ly it 
should h ave vacated and re manded with i nstructions to dismiss for lack o f  j ur isdiction . 
Nonetheless,  the Court ' s  refe rence to the courts ' lack of "power . . to a ITest the public 
rep resenta t ives or agents of Indian nations" suggests a lack of jur isd i cti on , and i t  echoes 
language trad itionally used to describe s ta te sovereign immun ity . See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign 
Imml lnity os 0 Doctrine of Persollo/ .Juri.,·dir:rioll, 1 1 5  HARV. L. REV. 1 5 59,  1 5 68 (2002) 
("When members of the Found ing: �i.: i lcration cons i dered whether the C0 11 ..; r i t l lt i oll exp osed 
uI1consenting states to su i t, they consistently focused on states ' amenab i l i ty to compulsory 
process, and they thought in terms th a t modern lawyers would associate w i th persona l rather 
than subj ec t matter juri sd iction . ") . 
8 5 .  David P. Currie , Sovereign immunity and Suits Agains[ Government Ojficers, 1 984 
SUP. CT . REv. 1 49, 1 5 3 (discussing the reason ing of In re Ayers, 1 23 U.S .  443 ( 1 887» ; see also 
Vicki C.  Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial 
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH.  INT 'L L. REv. 52 1 ,  525-26 (2003) (discussing federal 
government l iability in the early n ineteenth century and noting that "[ c ]ontracts claims were 
generally subj ect to the rule that an agent who s igned for a disclosed principal had no l iabi l ity to 
perform the contract"). 
86. 248 U.S. 354 ( 1 9 1 9) .  
87 .  Id. at 358 .  
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enacted a statute that pennitted nation members to enclose grazing land 
under certain conditions.88 Clarence Turner, who apparently was not a 
member of the Creek Nation,89 created a company (whose named principals 
were Creek Indians) for the purpose of enc losing a huge tract of land under 
the Creek statute .90 It appears that the statute was designed to protect tribal 
land from encroachment by non-tribe members, and that Turner's  project 
came to be viewed as violating the spirit if  not the letter of the statute .9 1  As 
a result, three groups of Creek Indians destroyed the fence that Turner's  
company had built . 92 After the Creek Nation refused to pay compensation 
to Turner, he sued the Nation and the United States (as the Nation's  trustee) 
in the Court of Claims, seeking damages. 93 The COUl1 of Claims dismissed 
the petition, and Turner sought review in the Supreme Court . 94 In nll ing 
that Turner lacked a cause of action, the Supreme Court referred to, but did 
not rely upon, the doctrine of sovereign immunity: "The fundamental 
obstacle to recovery is not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, but the lack 
of a substantive right to recover the damages resulting from fai lure of a 
government or its officers to keep the peace ., ,95 Although Congress had 
enacted legislat ion in 1 908 that authorized the COUl1 of C l a ims "to consider 
and adjudicate and render j udgment as law and equity may require in the 
matter of [Turner ' s  c laim] against the Creek Nation,, ,9h the Court held that 
this statute did not create a cause of action against  the Nation.97 In 
discussing the statute, the Court also noted that "[ w ] ithout authorization 
from Congress , the Nation could not . . .  have been sued in any cOUl1; at 
88 .  Id. at 355 .  
89 .  Turner's father, John E. Turner, was not a member of  the Creek Nation. Turner v. Old 
Homestead Co. ,  1 70 P. 904, 905 (Okla. 1 9 1 8) .  Some years prior to the events described in the 
text, Clarence Turner had married Tookah Butler, a woman of Cherokee, Creek and non-Indian 
descent who had been adopted into the Creek Nation. Turner v .  Un ited S tates, 5 1  Ct. C l .  1 25 ,  
1 3 1  ( 1 9 1 6) ;  1 0  GRANT FOREivIAN, CHRONICLES O F  OKLAf- Imv!.\ 1 8  (?\u. I ,  1 9 32), availahle at  
http ://digita l . l ibrary . okstate .eciu/Chron ic les/vO I OlvO 1 OpO 1 8 .  htm l ( l ac; 1.  v i:;  i teel Feb .  7 .  2004).  
90. Turner, 5 1  Ct. Cl. a t  1 3  I .  
9 1 .  As the United States later put it , "The act was i n tended to prevent the very thing that 
happened, the acquisition by outsiders and noncitizens of an immense tract of 256,000 acres, 
and it was this violation of the spiri t  and letter of the act which caused rhe destruction of the' 
pasture fence." Brief for the United States at 1 5 ,  Turner v. United States, 248 U .S .  354 ( 1 9 1 9) 
(No. 33) .  
92 .  Turner, 248 U .S .  at 356 .  
93.  Id. at 357 .  
94 . Id. 
95 .  Id. at 3 5 8 .  
96. Id. at 3 5 6-57 (quoting Act of May 29, 1 908,  ch. 2 1 6 ,  § 26 , 35  S tat. 444, 457). 
97. Turner, 248 U .S .  at 3 5 8 .  
1 52 ARIZONA STA TE LA W JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L . J .  
least without its consent, , ;98 but this was dictum, since the 1 908  statute gave 
such authorization. 
If sovereign immuni ty principles · furnished an alternative holding in 
Parks and dictum in Turner, they formed the sole basis of the Court's 1 940 
holding in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 
("USF&G,,) .99 The United S tates had leased to a coal company land 
belonging to the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, and USF&G had acted 
"as surety on a bond guaranteeing payment of the lease royalties" by the 
coal company. I OO The ass ignee of the coal company ' s  lease went into 
receivership and the United States filed a claim for royalties on the tribes'  
behalf. 1 0 1  I n  the receivership proceeding, the court offset the tribes '  debts 
to the assignee coal company against that company ' s  debts to the tribes ,  
resulting in a balance of some $9,000 in the company ' s  favor. ' 02 
Meanwhi le ,  the United States sued USF&G in a separate action for payment 
on the surety bond, and the trustee of the assignee coal company intervened 
to seek the balance determined in the receivership proceeding. 1 03 The 
district com1 found that the judgment in the receivership proceeding barred 
the c laim against USF &G and entitled the intervenor to a judgment for the 
1 04 balance. The Ccurt of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court 
reversed. l OS The Court assumed that the receivership judgment was valid 
insofar as it "satisfied" the tribe ' s  claim against the coal company, 1 06 but the 
Court held the receivership judgment "void in so far as it unde11akes to fix a 
credit against the Indian Nations" because " [tJhese Indian Nations are 
exempt from suit wi thout Congressional authorization ." , o7 
98.  Jd. The ful l  quote is :  "The special act of May 29, 1 908 ,  did not impose any l iabi l ity 
upon the Creek Natio n .  The tribal government had been dissolved. Without authorization from 
Congress, the Nation could not then have been sued in any c o urt ; at least without i ts consent." 
fd. It might be argued that the Court 's  l anguage suggests that the impediment to sui t  (absent 
c ongress ional author intion)  ams.: from the di ssolution of the tri ba l  governmenl. Such an 
argument, however, seelllS lI 1 1pcrsuasive, because it i s  not clear  why d issolution woul d  augment 
a tribe 's  immunity from sui t. 
99. 309 U .S .  506 ( 1 940) .  
1 00 .  fd. at 5 1 0 .  
1 0 1 .  Jd. 
1 02 .  Jd. 
1 03 .  Id. at 5 1 0- 1 1 .  
1 04 .  Id. at 5 1 1 .  
1 05 .  ld. at 5 1 1 ,  5 1 6 . 
1 06 .  Jd. at 5 1 1 .  The United States had conceded this point. ld. 
1 07.  Id. at 5 1 2  (cit ing Turner v .  United S tates, 248 U .S .  3 54, 358  ( 1 9 1 9);  Adams v .  
Murphy, 1 65 F. 304, 308 (8th Cir .  1 908);  Thebo v .  Choctaw Tribe of Indians, 66  F .  372 (8th 
Cir. 1 895)) .  
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S ince deciding USF& G, the Court has reaffirmed the doctrine of tribal  
sovereign immunity and has construed that doctrine broadly. 1 08 Admittedly, 
despite its recognition that the Constitution itse lf does not diminish tribal 
sovere ign immunity-because "it would  be absurd to suggest that the tribes 
sunendered immunity in a c onvention to which they were not even 
parties" I 09-the Court has stated that Congress 's  plenary power over the 
tribes includes the power to limit tribal immunity . I I O However, the Court 
has imposed a c lear statement rule  similar to that employed with respect to 
state immunity : No diminution of triba l  immunity wi l l  be found unless 
Congress has c learly and unequivocal ly stated its intent to abrogate that 
. . I I I  Immumty. 
More recentl y, though, members of the Court have expressed qualms 
about the doctrine . The Court 's  recent deci sion in Kiowa Tribe of 
Oklahoma v. lv1anufacturing Technologies l 1 2 is i l lustrative. Although six 
Justices held in Kiowa Tribe that a tribe ' s  sovere ign immunity extends to 
suits on contracts regarding off-reservation commerc ia l  activities, those 
Justices went out of their way to express d iscomfort with triba l  sovere ign 
immunity and to suggest that Congress should consider a ltering the 
doctrine . 1 1 3  The Court asserted that "the doctrine of tribal immunity . . .  
developed almost by accident" ; it noted that Turner's  discussion of tribal 
immunity "is , at best, an assumption of immunity for the sake of argument, 
not a reasoned statement of doctrine"; and it complained that subsequent 
cases upho ld ing tri bal  sovereign immunity did so "with l ittle analysis. , , 1 1 4  
The Court 1 isted "reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the 
doctrine" : 
At o ne t ime , the doctrine of triba l  immun i ty from sui t  m i ght h ave 
been th ought necessary to protect nascent tribal govemments from 
encroachments by States .  In  our interdependent and mobile 
soci ety, however, triba l i mmunity extends beyond what is needed 
to safeguard tribal self governance.  This is  evident when tribes 
1 08 .  See Kio\\ � Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg.  Tech s . ,  I n c . ,  5 2 3  U.S. 75 1 ,  760 ( 1 998) ("T r ibes  
enjoy immun i ty from suits on contracts, whether those contracts involve governmental or  
commercial  �ctivities and whether they were made on or  off a reservation."); see generally 
Seie lstad, supra note 2, at 694-99 (discussing USF &G and subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
concerning tribal sovereign immunity). 
1 09 .  Blatchford v. Native ViiI .  of Noatak, 5 0 1  U .S .  775 ,  782 ( 1 99 1 ) . 
1 1 0 .  See, e.g. , Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S .  49, 58  ( 1 978) ("This aspect of 
tribal sovereignty, l ike a l l  others, is subject to the superior and plenary control of Congress .") .  
I l l . See id. ("[A] waiver of  sovereign immun i ty cannot be implied but must be  
unequivocally expressed.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1 1 2 .  523 U .S .  75 1 ( 1 998). 
1 1 3 .  ld. at 756-60. 
1 1 4 .  Jd. at 756-57.  
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take part in  the Nation ' s  commerce.  Tribal enterprises now 
include ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non­
Indians .  In this economic context, immunity can , hann those who 
are unaware that they are deal ing with a tribe, who do not know of 
tribal immunity, or who h ave no choice in the matter, as in the 
case of tort victims. I I S  
Despite these concerns, the Court chose "to defer to  Congress" because of  
the latter' s  superior abi l ity "to weigh and accommodate the competing 
1 · d l '  . , , 1 1 6 po ICY concerns an re lance mterests . 
The Kiowa Court was inaccurate in assuming that Turner provides the 
ear liest Supreme Court reference to principles of tribal  sovereign immunity; 
Parks, dec ided some 70 years prior to Turner, indicates the force exerted by 
such principles in the mid-nineteenth century . 1 1 7 More importantl y, the 
Court gave unduly short shrift to the policies that weigh in favor of tribal 
sovereign immunity; as I wil l  discuss in P art V, the functional justifications 
for tribal sovereign immunity are stronger than those for state sovereign 
immunity .  However, despite its grudging treatment of  tribal immunity, and 
its suggestion that Congress should  consider narrowing that immunity , I 1 8  
1 1 5 . fd. at 758  (citations omitted). The dissenting Justices also expressed d i staste for triba l  
sovereign i mmun i ty ,  ass erti ng thQt "[g]overnments, l ike individuals, should pay their de bts and 
should be h e l d  accountable fo r their unlawful ,  injurious c onduct. "  ld. at 766 ( S tevens, J . ,  j o ined 
by Thomas & G insburg , JJ. ,  dissenting).  Justice Thomas h as taken a markedly d i ffe rent view 
w i th respect to state governments, voting with the majority in recent d e c i s ions e x panding s tate 
sovereign immunity from private su i ts to enforce federal law. See, e.g. , A l den v. Maine, 527 
U S . 706 ( 1 999);  Seminole Tribe o f  F l a .  v .  f lorida, 5 1 7 U.S.  44 ( 1 996). 
1 1 6 .  Kiowa Tribe, 523 U . S .  at 759-60.  
1 1 7 .  T h e  Court 's  recognit ion of federal sovereign immunity occurred a t  roughly t h e  same 
t ime.  A s  Vicki Jackson explains :  
The first clear reierence to the sovereign i mmunity of the Un ited States in  
an opinion for the entire Court appears to b e  in Cohens v .  Virg i nia, 19 U . S .  (6 
Wheat. )  264, 4 1 1 - 1 2  ( 1 82 1 )  (dic tum) ( l iTh e  universally rece ived opinion i s ,  
th at no s u i t  c a n  b e  commenced ur prosecuted against t h e  United S Wtc:s; that the 
judiciary act does n o t  authorize such suits . ") . . . .  For an t'8rl ier  but  more 
ambiguous reference, see Martin v.  Hunter's Lessee, 1 4  U . S .  ( 1  Wheat.) 304, 
33 5-3 6 ( 1 8 1 6) . . .  Not un t i l  1 846 did the Supreme Court invoke the 
propos ition that the Uni ted S tates was subject to suit only by its consent given 
i n  legisiation as a basis to deny relief. See Uni ted States v. McLemore, 45 
U.S.  (4 How.) 286 ,  288 ( 1 846) . . . .  
Jackson, supra note 85,  at 523 n .5 .  
1 1 8 .  One commentator has  noted that Kiowa Tribe suggests "that the Court views tribal 
sovereignty as a temporary measure which the tribes should only be able to take advantage of  
until they become self-sufficient enough to  participate in the larger white society on equal terms 
with everyone else." Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court 's 
Divestment and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 1 8  BUFF. PUB. INT. LJ. 1 47, 1 80 (2000). 
Tweedy considers th is view inconsistent w ith the conventional treatment of other governmental 
36 :0 1 37] TRIBAL IMMUNITY AND TRIBAL COUR TS 1 55 
the Court reaffirmed that immunity and interpreted it broadly. This resul t  
stands in stark contrast to other recent Court decis ions concerning tribal 
sovereignty. To compare the significance of Kiowa with that of recent 
decisions that narrowed other aspects of tribal  sovereignty, i t  is necessary to 
consider the actual impact of tribal immunity .  Accordingly, in Part I I I ,  I 
survey tribal immunity law from a number of tribes.  
III .  THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF REMEDIES AGAINST TRIBES 
This Section briefly reviews a number of types of possible c lai ms 
against tribes , and discusses the fora and remedies available for those 
c laims. I 19 This survey yields two conclusions. F irst, numerous tribes 
provide some recourse to c laimants with c iv i l  rights , tort, employment, or 
contract c laims, though the tribes may l imit the remedies available on those 
claims. Second, becaus.e many tribes l imit their waivers of immunity to 
suits in their own courts , a maj or effect of tribal immunity is to channe l 
l itigation against tri bal governments to tribal courts . ! �O 
Under some circumstances , tribal ent i t ies may be sued in non-tribal 
courts. A tribe can waive immunity from suit ! 2 ! ; moreover, under current 
doctrine , Congress has the power to abrogate tribal immunity from sui t , 
though it has rarely done so in recent years . 1 22  Even where no waiver or 
abrogation has occurred, a plaintiff might seek injunctive relief against 
immunities: "[I]t is not as though we expect other quasi-sovere igns, such as states, to outgrow 
sovereign i mmunity once they have a sufficient tax basc ." Id at 1 79. 
1 1 9. In this sect ion, 1 rely l argely on tribal court decis ions pub l ished in the Indian Law 
Reporter and on triba l  constitutions, codes and judicial decis ions made available on the National 
Tribal Justice Resource Center ' s  website, http ://www.tr ibal resourcecenter. org/courts/. These 
sources may not provide a representative sampling of tribal l aw in general .  See Robert J. 
McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: Th e Indian Bill olRights at Th irty Years, 34 IDAHO L .  
REv. 465,  490 ( 1 998) (noting the "inherent risk in re ly ing on self-selected case reports") . 
However, the cases ,  statutes and constitutional provis ions d i scussed in the text do provide a 
sense of the curre nt  approach of at least some tribes. 
1 20 .  C/ Thul Il<:tS P. Sch losser, So vereign IlIl lIlLlll iiY .  SiIOUld the Suvereign Control [lie 
Purse?, 24 Aivl . No!.\1\' L .  REV. 309, 3 1 7  (2000) ("Sovere ign  immunity is best  understood as the 
power of  a govcrnment to define the forum, procedure, and l imits to be placed upon suits 
against itsel f.") .  
1 2 1 .  E.g. , C&L Enters . ,  v .  C it izen B and Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. ,  532 U.S. 4 1 1 ,  
423 (200 1 )  (holding that tribe could be  sued in state court to enforce an arbitration award, 
because tribe had entered into contract contain ing arbitration and choice-of-Iaw clauses that 
waived tribe ' s  immunity from suit). 
1 22 .  See WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 2, at 233-35 (discussing abrogation of tribal 
immunity with respect to "depredation claims" in the late eighteenth to early twentieth 
centuries); id. at 235-36 (discussing the McCarran Amendment's abrogation, in 1 952 ,  of tribal 
immunity with respect to water rights l itigation); id. at 236 (discussing Eighth C ircuit 's  holding 
that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1 976 abrogates tribal immunity). 
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tribal officials under an Ex parte Young theory. 1 23 However, to  obtain 
re lief against a tribal entity, the p laintiff not only must surmount tribal 
immunity, but also must possess a cause of action. In many instances, the 
latter requirement wil l  not be met: the Bi ll of Rights does not bind Indian 
tribes ,
1 24 tribes are not among the potentia l  defendants in actions under 
Section 1 9 83 , 1 25 and the Indian Civil  Rights Act does not (outside of the 
habeas corpus context) give rise to a cause of action in non-tribal court . 1 26 
Thus , many remedies are obtainable against a tribe in tribal court b ut 
not elsewhere . As noted, outside the hab eas context, civil  rights c la ims 
against a tribe can general ly be brought only in triba l  court. l 27 Some tribal 
courts have held that the Indian Civil  Rights Act creates a cause of  action in 
tribal court. 1 28 In other tribes , triba l  statutory or constitutional provis ions 
have incorporated the ICRA provisions , 1 29 and some tribes have created a 
cause of action for ICRA violations. In sti l l  other tribes, the tribal 
constitution or statutory law p rovides protections similar to the ICRA, 1 30 
1 23 .  See. e.g , Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436  U.S. 49, 59 ( 1 978)  (citing Young vvilh a 
"cf" signal and stating that "[a]s an officer of the Pueblo,  petitioner Lucario Padi l la is not 
protected by the tribe's immunity from suit"); Big Horn County Flec. Coop. ,  Inc. v. Adams, 2 1 9  
F . 3d  944, 954 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that "suits for prospective injunctive rel ief  arc 
pemlissible against tribal officers under the Ex Parte Young framework") . 
1 24 .  See Talton v. Mayes, 1 63 U .S .  376, 382-83 ( I R96). 
1 25 .  See Inyo County v .  Paiute-Shoshone Indians of  the B ishop Cmty. of  the Bishop 
Colony, _ U.S .  _, 1 23 S .  Ct. 1 887, 1 892 (2003) ("[T]he parties agree, and we will assume 
for purposes of this opinion, that Native American tribes, l ike States of  the Union , are not 
subject to suit under § 1 983 ."); R.J. Wi l l iams Co. v. Fort Be lknap Hous. Auth . ,  7 1 9  F.2d 979, 
982 (9th C ir.  1 983)  ("As the purpose of 42 U.S .c .  § 1 983 i s  to enforce the provisions of  the 
fourteenth amelldment, i t  fol lows that actions taken under color of tribal law are beyond the 
reach o f  § 1 983 . . .  . " ' )  (citation omitted) .  
1 26. See Martinez, 436 U .S. at 70 .  
1 2 7.  See supra notes 5 1-5 5 and accompanying text. 
128 .  See, e.g ,  Palenc ia  v.  Pojoaque Gaming, Inc . ,  28 Indian L. Rep . 6 1 49 ,  6 1 5 1 --53 (Pueblo 
of  Pojoaque Tribal Ct .  200 I )  (finding that tribal gaming enterprise 's  security staff vi olated 
ICRA ' s  due process and search and seizure prov is ions, and awarding damages). 
1 29 .  See. e.g , CON ST. !\:-JD BY-LAWS OF Ti lE  CO\,FED Llv\TEO TRII3 ES OF Ti lE GRAND R00iDE 
COMMUN ITY or OREC00!, art. I l l ,  § 3 (k) ("Th.:! Trihe sha l l  prov ide to all persons with in i ts 
jurisdiction the rights guaranteed by the fndian Civi l R ights Act of 1 968 .") , avoiloble ot 
http ://www.granclronde.org/LegaIlDocs/ConstitLl t ion.pdf (last vis ited Feb. 28, 2004); I 
M ASHANTUCKET �EQUOT TRIBAL LAWS tit . 1 ,  ch. 3 ,  § 1 0( a) (2000) ("The Indian Civ i l  Rights 
Act, codified at 25 U . s . c .  § 1 302, and all amendments thereto , is hereby adopted as Tribal law 
and shall apply in the Tribal Court."), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfo lderiMPEQUOT 1 .HTM (last updated 2000) . 
1 30.  See, e.g. , COLVILLE TRlBAL LAW & ORDER CODE § 1 -5-2 ( 1 988)  (setting  forth c iv i l  
rights prOViSIOns similar to those in the ICRA), available at 
http ://www. tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/colvi lle_lawandorder_CHPT I -5 . html (last  vis ited 
Feb. 28 ,  2004); CONST. OF THE HO-CHUNK NATION art. X (same), available at 
http : //www. tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfo lderlhochunk_const.htm ( last visi ted Feb . 28, 2004); 
see Vicki J. L imas, Employment Suits Against Indian Tribes: Balancing Sovereign Rights and 
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with the result that the tribal court may grant relief under the tribal- law 
provision without deciding whether rel ief is also available under the ICRA. 
Although not all tribal courts find that Congress abrogated tribal 
immunity from suit in tribal court under the ICRA, 1 3 1  this question is often 
academic because many tribes have, to varying degrees , waived immunity 
from suit on civil rights c laims . 1 32 Some tribes have authorized damages 
c laims, subject to a damages cap or to the limits of the tribe ' s  l iabi lity 
insurance. 1 33 Many tribes have authorized suit against tribal officials for 
dec laratory and injunctive re l ief with respect to c laims under civil  rights 
laws or the triba l  constitution. 1 34 The relief awarded against tribal officials 
Civil Rights, 70 DENV. U .  L. REv. 3 59 ,  382-83 ( 1 993)  ("Many tribal consti tut ions contain b i l l s  
of rights and, as  indicated in the preceding section, a number of tribes have c o d i fi e d  civi l  rights 
laws that grant triba l  members due process and equal protection rights. ") (footnotes omitted). 
1 3 1 .  See L imas, supra note 1 30 ,  at 380 ("Tribal courts d isagree on whether the ICRA itself 
waives sovereign immun ity of tribes in tribal courts for actions alleging vi o l a t i ons of that 
Act."); Waggoner v .  Muscogee (Cree k) Nation, D iv .  of Health Admin . ,  7 Ok la . Trib. 59 ,  2000 
WL 33 97630 1 (Muscogee (Cr.) D. Ct. 2000) (holding that ICRA did t lol abrogate tribal 
i m mu n i ty with respect to non-habeas claims, but that tribe had waived its immunity with respect 
to dec laratory and injunctive re l ief un der the TCRA), appeal dismissed, 7 Okl a .  Tri b .  1 5 4, 2000 
WL 33 976528 (Muscogee (Cr.) 2000) . 
1 3 2 .  See, e.g. , Terry-Carpenter v. L as Vegas Paiute Tribal Counci l ,  2 9  Indian L. Rep. 604 1 ,  
6046 (Las Vegas Paiute Ct. App. 2002) (hold ing that ICRA did not abrogate tribal immunity 
ii'om suit in tribal court but that tribe had waived its immunity with respect to suits in tribal 
court to enforce the procedural requi re ments of tribe 's membership ord inance, and tak in g a 
broad view of what constinltes a "procedura l" chal lenge for purposcs of the wa iver of 
i m munity) , reh 'g denied & opinion clarified, Terry-Carpenter v .  Las Vegas P a i u t e  Tribal 
Counci l ,  29 Indian L.  Rep . 6059 (Las Vegas Paiute Ct. App. 2002) ;  see also Frank 
Pommershei m, Tribal Court Jurisprudence.' A Snapshot ji-om the Field, 2 1 VT. L. REV . 7, 22 
( 1 996) (with respect to ICRA claims, noting that "[g] enerally, but not a lway::; . tr iba l COl l l1S  have 
fou n d  a waiver of sovereign immunity, explici t ly or implici tly, in the triba l  constitut ion or the 
hold ing of Santa Clara Pueblo") . 
1 3 3 .  See, e.g , COLVILLE TRlI3'-\L LAW & ORDER CODE § 1 -5 - 8 (provid ing that to the extent 
thJt  a claim in tribal court under tribJI civil rights provisions is  covered by the tribe ' s  l iabi l ity 
insurance, "suit may be brought for d amages lip to the fu ll ava i lab le  amount  of the coverage 
provided ill the insurance policy"); 1 MASI IANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LA'vVS l i l .  l ,  e lL  3, � 1 1  
(wa iv i ng sovere ign immunity wi th  respect to c laims asserting I C RA vio\at i ,)ns hy triba l p o l ice 
on tribal lands, but capping damages Jt S5 00,000 per incident, barring puni tive cl<:lmages, and 
l i m i t i ng pain  and sufferi ng da mages to 50  percent  of economic damages) . 
1 34. See, e.g. , COLVILLE TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER CODE §§ 1 -5-3 to 1 -5-5 (au thorizing 
suits in tribal court for dec laratory and/or injunctive re lief against tribal officials and employees 
to enforce triba l  c ivi l  rights provisions); CON ST. OF THE HO-CHUNK NATION, art . XII, § 2 .  
("Officials and employees of the Ho-Chunk Nation who  act beyond the scope of their duties or 
authority shall be subject to suit in equity only for declaratory and non-monetary inj unctive 
re l ief in  Tribal Court . . .  for purposes of enforcing . . .  this constitution or other appl icable 
laws."); Ho-Chunk Nation Legislature v.  Ho-Chunk Nation Gen. Counci l ,  2 8  I ndian L. Rep. 
6 1 68,  6 1 7 1 -72 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. June 22,  200 1 )  (stating that Ho-Chunk Nation 
officials may be sued in tribal court for injunctive or declaratory rel ief for v iolations of tribal 
law); Gourd v. Robertson, 28 Indian L. Rep. 6047, 6048 (Sp irit Lake Tribal Ct. 200 1 )  ("[A] 
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under such provisions can be significant. 1 35  Moreover, some tribal courts 
have demonstrated their will ingness to enforce injunctive relief by means of 
monetary contempt sanctions against tribal governmental defendants . 1 36 A 
p la intiff might also sue a tribal official  for damages in his  or her individual 
capacity; a number of tribes permi t  such claims , subject to a qual ified 
. . d .c  1 37 Immumty elense. 
Tribal approaches to tort c laims also vary. With respect to tort c laims 
aris ing out of a tribe ' s  activities in impl ementing certain federal programs, a 
pla int iff may be able to recover damages from the United States under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA, ,) . 1 3 8  With respect to c laims outside the 
tribal official  is not immune from suit for declaratory and injunctive relief for an a l leged 
violation of the Indian Civi l  Rights Act.");  Standing Rock Group for Accountab i l i ty v. 
Defender, 29 I ndian L. Rep. 60 1 4, 60 1 6  (Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Ct.  200 1 )  ("Sovereign 
immunity . . .  does not bar a suit for equitable or injunctive re l ief against an Indian tribe or  tribal 
offi c ial who exceeds h is  authority under tribal law and in  so doing violates the statutory or 
constitutional righ ts of a tribal member.") ;  Rave v .  Reynolds, 23 Indian L. Rep. 6 1 S 0 , 6 1 63-64 
(Winneb ago Sup . Ct. 1 996) ( in l itigation concerni ng election disputes, holding that Tribal Code 
au thori zed suit  for injunctive and declaratory re l ief against triba l  officials); cf McCarthy, supra 
note 1 1 9 .  at S 1 3  ("Most tribal courts h ave found the ICRA to be enforceab le against tr ibal 
officials but not against the sovereign itse lf  . . .  ") ;  Nell  Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: 
Olle Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal C01lrts, 22 AM . INDIAN L. REV. 2 8 S ,  3 3 9  ( 1 998) 
(noting that "[s]ome tribes . . .  specifical ly waive sovereign immunity for I ndian Civil Rights 
Act cascs, but l imit that waiver to i njunctive or  dec laratory relief') . 
1 3 5 .  See. e.g. , Lowe v. Ho-Chunk Nation Legis lahlre Members, 29 Indian L .  Rep. 6076, 
6077 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct .  200 I )  ( in redis tricting l itigation, setting a deadl ine for the 
legis lature to " submit a different final red istrict ingireapportionment proposal to the Court"); 
Standing Rock Group for A ccountability, 29 Indi an L. Rep. at 60 1 8  (in l it igation concerning the 
use of some S2 mi l lion in tribal monies, enjoining tribal  district officials "from expending any 
of the money . . .  until such t ime as [they 1 submit[ ]  a detailed budget to the Tribal Counci l  
detai l ing spec ifiC proposed expenditures and that budget is approved by the Council") .  
l 3 6. See, e.g. , Smith v. Beard, 28  Indian L. Rep. 6006, 6009, 60 1 4  (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial 
Ct .  2000) (award ing the plaintiff some S 1 6 ,000, and explain ing that the coul1 'S  order to place 
plaint iff on admini strative leave with pay was an "ongoing contempt sanction to the Nation for 
not obey i ng the order to re instate" the plai n t i ff), reconsideration denied, 28 I ndian L.  Rep. 60 1 5  
(Ho-Cl lunk Nation Trial Ct. 2000, aiI'd, 28 I ndian L .  Rep. 6044 (Ho-Chunk Natioll Supreme Cr.  
20( ) I ) . It'considemriol1 denied, 28 Indian [ Rep. 6 1 2 0 (Ho-Chunk  Nation Suprc me Ct .  200 I )) ;  
cf 117 re Hardenburgh ,  28 Tndian L. Rep.  6094,  6095 (Little R iver Band of Ottawa Tndians Tribal 
Ct. App. 2000) (setting a deadl ine for triba l e lect ion board to resolve elect ion disputes, and 
sta t ing court ' s  '.intention to " impose a tifty-doll ar (SSO.OO) fine on each ind ividual Board 
member for each calendar day" of delay). 
1 3 7 .  See, e.g. , Gourd, 2 8  Indian L. Rep . at 6049 (holding that p laintiff could recover 
damages on ICRA claim against general manager of tribal casino if plaintiff showed that the 
defendant "violated a c learly-establ ished r ight of the pla intiff') . I have not been able to find  
data on the extent to  which tribes indemnify tribal officials with respect to such c laims. 
1 38 .  See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act ("ISDEAA"), 25 U .S .c .  
§ §  450-450n & 45 8-458e;  25  U . S .c.  § 4S0f(d) (claims arising from certain health services 
activities); 25  U . S .c. §450f note (cla ims ari s ing from tribal performance of an agreement under 
the I SDEAA); 25 U.S .C .  § 2804(a) (authorizing Secretary of Interior to enter into agreements 
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scope of the FTCA, many tribes obtain l iabi lity insurance, with the resul t  
that a p laintiff may recover damages up to the amount of the l iabi l ity 
coverage. 1 39 Other tribes have set a cap on damages , or have l imited the 
amount of noneconomic damages to some multiple  of economIC 
damages. 1 40 
As triba l  governments and tribal ly-owned enterprises grow, the 
potential for employment-related c laims increases . 1 4 1  A number of tribes 
have established administrative processes for the resolut ion of such c laims. 
for the use of tribal personnel or faci l ities in  law enforcement in Indian country) ;  25 U . S . c .  § 
2804(f) (providing that tribal personnel acting under authority granted under Section 2804(a) 
are considered employees of the Department of the Interior for Federal Tort C laims Act  
purposes) ; see generally UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL TORT 
CLAIMS ACT: ISSUES AFFECTING COVERAGE FOR TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION CONTRACTS 
(July 2000). 
1 3 9 .  See, e.g , I MAS HANTUCKET PEQUOT TRlRAL LAWS tit .  4,  ch.  1 ,  § §  4 ,  5 .  9 (200) 
(waiving tribal gaming enterprise 's  immunity from suit, up  to the l imits of the applicable 
l iabi l i ty insurance, for tort c la ims arising from negl igent acts,  but barring punitive dalTlagcs and 
l imiting noneconomic damages to 50 percent of economic damages) , available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolderiMPEQUOT 1 . HTM ( last updated 2000). 
Congress recently directed the Secretary of the Interior to conduct "a comprehensive survey of 
the degree, type, and adequacy of l iab i li ty insurance coverage of Indian tribes," in order "to 
faci l i tate relief for a person who is  injured as a result of an official  action of a tribal 
government." Indian Tribal Tort Claims and Risk Management Act of 1 99 8 ,  Pub. L .  No. 1 05-
277,  D iv. A, § 1 0 I Ce) , 1 1 2 Stat. 268 1 -3 3 5  to 268 1 -3 3 7  (reprinted at  2 5  U . S . C .  § 450f notc); 
Seie lstad, supra note 2, at 725-26 (discussing this provision). The survey, which was released 
in July 2000, \vas less comprehensive than origindlly il ltellded; responses were provided only as 
to roughly two in five tribes, and most tribal respondents did not submit complete claims h istory 
information. See BUREAU OF INDIAN A FFAIRS, SURVE Y  OF L IAB ILITY INSURANCE COVE RAGE 5-
6 (July 2000) (noting that 1 44 tribes responded to the survey and that the BIA rece ived 
responses from insurance carriers with respect to an additional s ixty-five tribes) .  Of the tribes 
for which infonnation was provided, eighty-six percent had insurance coverage . See id. at 7 .  
The other fourteen percent appear to  be  mostly small  tribes vvith no gaming operations. See id. 
at 7-8 . 
1 4( ) .  ,'lee l IV!AS I I ANTUC KET PEQUOT TRI Hr\L LAWS, t i t .  1 2 , ch . 1 ,  § 2 (wa iv i l l �  tr ibe ' s 
sovereign immunity for c laims in tribal court regarding "a tort of the Tribe or i ts agents, 
servants, or employees acting within the scope of their emp loyment," but providing tha t  only 
compensatory damages are available for personal injury claims and l imi ting noneconomic 
damages for personal injury claims to fifty percent of economic damages) . 
1 4 1 .  L imas, supra note 1 30, at 362-64.  Both Title VII and the Americans with D isabi l i ties 
Act expressly exempt tribal employers from their scope .  See 42 U .S .c . § 2000e(b) (exemption 
of tribal government employers from Title VII); 42 U .S .c . § 1 2 1  1 1 (5)(B) (exemption of tribal  
governments from employment provisions of ADA) ; see also Mitchel l  Peterson, Student 
Article, The Applicability of Federal Employment Law to Indian Tribes, 47 S . D .  L. REv. 63 1 ,  
657 (2002) (arguing, with respect to federal employment statutes, that "[i]f tribal sovereignty is 
impacted, infringed, or impl icitly divested by app lication of the statute, then the statute should 
not appl y  to tribes unless Congress has clearly expressed such intent") . 
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Judicial review of administrative determinations is often available .  1 42 
Relief may include reinstatement and, sometimes , the award of back pay. 1 43 
Contract c laims against tribes may be subject to varying modes of 
dispute resolution. 1 44 As noted above, a tribe may waive i ts  immunity by 
contract, and may permit suit in tribal or non-tribal courts . The 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, for example, has waived its immunity from suit 
in tribal court on a l l  c laims concerning contracts duly executed by the Tribe, 
. 1 45 unless the contract expressly states otherwIse. 
In sum, a number of tribes provide remedies for c ivi l  rights, tort and 
contract c laims against tribal government defendants . Not all tribes provide 
ful l  remedies ; 1 46 however, in assessing the current avail ab i lity of remedies 
1 42 .  See, e.g. , In re Cathy Dupuis, 28 Indian L .  Rep. 6078, 6079 (Confederated Sal ish and 
Kootenai Tribes Ct. App. 200 1 )  (remanding with directions to the trial court to "carefully and 
thoroughly make a review of the admin istrative action to determine whether the policies and 
procedures were fo l lowed and that the decision was not arb itrary and capri cious"); 
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMM UNITY OF OREGON TRIBAL CODE S 
255 .5(d)(8 ) (prov iding that tribal court may reverse administrative decision regarding 
employment d ispute if  decision violates tribal or federal law,  i s  "arbitrary, capric ious,  [or] an 
abuse of di scretion," or "[ i ]s  not supported by substantial evidence"), available a f  
http ://www.grandronde .org/Legal/Docs/EmployActionReview.pdf ( last vis i ted Feb. 2 8 ,  2004) ; 
Kagigebi v. Decorah, 29 Indian L .  Rep. 608 1 ,  6086 (Ho-Chunk ation Trial Ct. 2002) (holding 
that discipl inary action against an employee was "arbitrary, capric ious and an abuse of 
d iscretion," and ordering the Nation "to delete the discipl ine from Mr. Kagigeb i ' s  work record 
and to repay h im for the improper one-day suspension plus interest at  five p ercent . . .  from the 
date of th is  Judgment"); LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTA WA INDIANS O RDINANCES AND 
REGULATIONS ch.  600,  §§ 8 . 3 ,  8 .6  (providing for tribal court review of administrative resolut ion 
of  employee grievances) ; B ial ik v. L ittle River Gaming Comm 'n, 28 Indian L.  Rep. 6 1 60, 6 1 6 1  
( Litt le R iver Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Ct .  200 I )  (hold ing that tribe 's  adoption of personnel 
po licy waived t ribal gaming commission' s  sovere ign immuni ty with respect to tribal court 
review of employee grievances) ; Gwin v. Four Bears Casino and Lodge, 30 Indian L .  Rep.  
6 1 20, 6 1 2 1  (Three Affi l i ated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation D .  Ct .  2003) (hold ing that 
tribal casino " wa ived its immunity from suit. . .  by enacting personnel polic ies and procedures 
that enable this Court to review the decisions of i ts third party administrators i n  termination of 
employment matters") .  
1 43 .  E.g. , CUNH:DERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RON DE CUM M UNITY OF OREGON TRlUAL 
CODE § 2 5 5 . 5 (<.:)(3)  (200 I) (providing that remedies under tribe 's  Employment Action Rev ic \\ 
Ordinance "shal l  be l i m i ted . . .  to reinstatement, payment of back pay, and payment of other 
back Employee Benefits") . 
1 44 .  Certai ti .. contracts that encumber tribal lands arc now required e ither to provide for 
remedies against the tribe in the event of breach or to disc lose the tribe ' s  policy with respect to 
the assertion of sovereign immunity. See 2 5  U. S .c .  § 8 1  (d)(2) ;  Seielstad, supra note 2 ,  at 722-
25 (discussing this provision).  
1 45 .  See, e.g. , 1 MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS t it .  1 2 , ch. 1 ,  §§  l (d)( l )  3 .  
1 46.  In 2000, the American Indian Law Center published the results o f  a survey concerning 
tribal courts. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CENTER, INC . ,  SURVEY OF TRIBAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
AND COURTS OF I NDI AN OFFENSES (May 2000) [hereinafter AILC SURVEY] '  Among many other 
questions, the survey i nquired about tribal sovereign immunity. Thirty-six respondents stated 
that their tribes had waived immunity, while fifty-seven respondents stated that their tribe had 
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against tribal defendants, it i s  useful to keep in mind that remedies against 
non-tribal governments are l ikewise far from complete. 
IV. THE CU RRENT LANDSCAPE OF REME DIES AGAINST NON-TRIBAL 
GOVERNMENTS 
Proponents of restrictions on tribal  immunity often contend that non­
tribal governments have abjured immunity, and that tribes should do so as 
wel l . This section briefly surveys the landscape of remedies against non­
tribal governments in the United States . The avail ab i lity of remedies 
against the United States has varied over time; as remedies against the 
not. See id. app. D ,  Descriptive Statist ics, at 30.  (My discussion of the survey results here and 
in notcs 222 and 225 l i sts the number of respondents whose answers were coded in a way that 
matched the options in the relevant survey questi on. The survey results also include a hand fu l 
of responses that were coded i n  categories other than the options given in the question. See, 
e.g. , id. app .  D, at 3 0  (responses coded for the question "Has your tribe waived its immun i ty 
from suit  in court?" inc luded fifty-seven "N··  responses, thirty-six " Y " responses, onc "B"  
response. two "9" responses, and three " 7" responses) . [ am om i tt ing the responses that wcre 
coded in those unexplained categori es.) Of the respondents reporting a waiver of tribal 
immun ity, one reported a "general waiver," fi ftcen reported "a l imi ted waiver . . .  for tort c la ims 
against the tribe," e ight reported "a l imi ted waiver  . . .  for c ivi l  rights claims against the tribe ,"  
twenty-fou r  reported "a l i mi ted waiver . . .  for spe c i fic bus iness activities," fi fteen reported "a 
l imited waiver . . .  as to specia l  triba l  publ ic  agencies," thirteen reported "a l imited waiver . . .  
as to tribal ly-owned bus iness enterprises," and seven reported "a l imited waiver" as to "other." 
ld. apr. 0 at 30-3 1 .  Twenty-two respondents reported that the waiver was "speci fic to . . . 
tribal court," five reported that i t  was "spec ific to . . .  federal court," and two reported that i t  was 
" speci fic to . . .  state court." ld. app. D at 3 \ .  
I t  is  questionable whether these results provide an accurate account of the remedies 
avai lable with respect to the responding tribes. The survey questions on sovereign i mmunity 
were ambiguous, i n  that they did not di stingu ish among types of remedies. Thus, for example, 
in response to the question "Has your tribe waived its immunity from suit in court?," a 
respondent might reasonably have answered "No" even if damages, i njunctions and declaratory 
re l ief  were avai lable against tribal officials .  (l id at 20 (noting that "the question o f  waiver as 
posed in the quest ionnaire may not have been suffi c i \..� 1 l l 1y clear to e l ic i t  accurate i n formatiu l l") .  
I t  i s  even l ess l ikely that the survey res \ l l t:-;  provide a representat ive p ic ture o f  t r iba l  
govern ment l i abi l i ty more general ly .  The  survey ' s  usefu lness is l imi ted by the low response 
rate; the survey \-vas sent to all federal ly recognized tribes, but only 1 34 tribes responded to allY 
part of the survey. See id. at 6-7 . Although the respondents were "generally representative of 
all tribes in terms of . . .  popU lation size," id. at 7, some tribes with greater finaneiai resources 
may have chosen not to respond to the survey due to concerns that the survey responses might 
be used as a basis for al tering the a llocation of  funding by the Bureau of Indian Affairs . See id. 
at 7 ("Of the tribes not responding, a number informally expressed reluctance to divulge 
inforn1ation about tribal programs and resources because of the widely-discussed possibi l i ty of 
changing the TPA al location and converting to a ' needs-based' al location.").  To the extent that 
tribes with greater economic resources are l ikely to have better-funded courts and to provide 
more extensive waivers of immun ity, self-selection bias may have skewed the survey 's  
sovereign immunity results. 
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federal government gradually expanded, relief against individual federal 
officials became harder to obtain. With respect to both the federal and state 
governments , there continue to exist significant l imits on governmental 
l iabili  ty. 
The United States ' first fonnal waiver of immunity occurred in the 
mid-nineteenth century; but even before that, significant remedies existed 
for those harmed by government action.  As Vicki Jackson recently noted, 
remedies against federal government officials included writs of habeas 
corpus, writs of mandamus, and inj unctions; moreover, a tort c laimant could 
seek damages against an official in his individual capacity. 1 47 By mid­
century, the government ' s  need to faci litate dealings with government 
contractors led to the creation of the Court of Claims and to waivers of  
federal immunity with respect to  contract, statutory and regulatory claims 
(though not tort c laims) . 1 48 In  1 946, the United States enacted a general tort 
c laims statute , 1 49 and in 1 976, Congress enacted the waiver of federal 
sovereign immunity currently contained in the Administrative Procedures 
Act CAP A,,) . I SO 
The expansion of remedies against the federal government is not 
complete , and it is not an unal loyed gain for those harmed by government 
action. Even today, the federal government retains noteworthy l imitations 
on its l iabi lity . 1 5 1  The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), for example , 
excludes recovery for claims arising from discretionary activities 1 5 2 or from 
1 47 .  See Jackson, supra note 85,  at 524-25 .  
1 48 .  See Judith Resnik, Of Courts, Agencies, and the Court of Federal Claims.· Fortunately 
Outliving One 's Anomalous Character, 7 1  GEO. WASH. L .  REv. 798,  80 1 (2003)  (di scussing the 
origins of the Court of Federal Claims);  Gregory C. S isk, The Tapeslly Un ravels .· StatutOlY 
Waivers of Sovereign Immunity and kloney Claims Against the United States, 7 1  GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 602, 607-08 (2003)  (discussing the Tucker Act, 24 S tat. 505 ( 1 887) ,  and its 
predecessors) . 
1 49 .  See Legislative Reorgan ization Act of 1 946, Pub. L. No. 79-60 1 ,  60 Stat. 8 1 2 , 842 
( 1 946) (cod ified as amended at 2S USc. � �  1 346(b),  267 1 -2680 ( 1 994 & S up p .  IV 1 998)); see 
I Ilso Matthew L. Zabel,  AdvisolJ' Juries and Their Use and !'vfisuse in Fec/.';I cd Tal! Claillls Act 
Cases, 2003 B YU 1. REV . 1 85 ,  1 90 -9 1  (discussing enactment of Federal Tort Claims Act). 
1 50 .  See Act of Oct. 2 1 ,  1 976,  Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 272 1 ( 1 976) (cod ified at 5 
US c. § 702 ( 1 999)); see Sisk, supra note 1 48 ,  at 6 1 5- 1 6  (explaining that prior to the 1 976 
amendment of th� APA, a c la im that a federal official  "abused discretion, reached an arbi trary 
and capricious decision,  or made a procedural error" was barred by federal sovereign immu nity 
unless the offic ial was exceeding the scope of his or her authority or was violating the 
Consti tution). 
1 5 1 .  See ERWfN CHEMERfNSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 6 1 9-30 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing 
l i mits on federal government's  l iabi lity under Federal Tort Claims Act). 
1 52 .  See 28 U.S.c.  § 2680(a) (2000) (excluding claims "based upon the exercise or 
performance or the fai l ure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of 
a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the d iscretion involved be 
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. . I 1 53 d '  b h d f . .  d 1 54 I many mtentlOna torts, an It ars t e awar 0 pumtIve 2mages. n 
addition, the Court has interpreted the FTCA to exclude claims by members 
of the Armed Services for injuries arising out o f  or occurring in  the course 
of mil itary service. 1 55 Meanwhile , the provision of remedies directly 
against the government has been a factor in the Court ' s  l imitation of 
remedies against federal officials in  their individual capac ities. 1 56 
State governments appear to have been s low to l imit governmental 
immunity. When Robert Leflar and Benj amin Kantrowitz surveyed state 
governments ' tort l iab i l ity in the 1 950s, they found that most states were 
more restrictive of government l iabi l ity than the United States . 1 5 7 Grouping 
the states into rough categories based on the availab i l ity of tort damages 
against states and state agencies , Leflar and Kantrowitz reported that 2 3  
states "seldom" or "almost never" accepted tort responsib i l ity, that 1 2  states 
"occasionally" did so, and that only 1 3  states did so in "most" or 
"substantially a l l"  instances. 1 5 8  The authors noted the gradual nature of  
change with respect to  state l iab i l ity: As  they exp lained, " [p  ]ractical ly 
every one of the states which now affords re l i ef  generally to persons injured 
by its torts did away with its sovereign immunity only a l i tt le bit at a 
t 'm , , 1 5 9 1 e .  
In  the half-century since the Leflar and Kantrowitz survey, 1 60 the states 
have appreciably expanded their waivers of immunity. 1 6 ! Nonetheless, 
abused") ; see also Jackson, supra note 85 ,  at 564 (discuss ing the "di scretionary function" 
exclusion). 
1 53 .  See 28 U.s .c .  � 2680(h) (2000) (excluding claims "ari sing out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, fa lse mrest, mal ic ious prosecution, abuse of process, l ibel ,  s lander, 
misrepresentation, deceit ,  or i nterference wi th contract rights," but not excluding c laims aris ing 
out of "assault, battery, fa lse imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious 
prosecution" by fed�ral law enforcement officers). 
1 54.  See 28 U .S .c .  § 2674 (2000); see also Zabel, supra note 1 49, at 1 92-93 (discussing 
l imitations placed on ac tions under the Federal Tort Cla ims Act) .  
1 55 .  See Feres v. United S tates, 340 U.S. 1 35 ,  1 46 ( 1 950) .  
1 56.  See Jacksu i l ,  SliplU note 85, at 564 CAs Co ngress has expanded the arena of 
government l iab i l i ty for tort (as in contracts and takings), so have Congress and the Court 
narrowed the avai lab i l i ty of actions against federal government employees.") .  
1 57 .  Robert A .  Leflar & Benjamin E. Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N . Y . U .  L .  
REv. 1 363,  1 407 ( 1 954) ("[T]he states genera l ly have not undertaken tort l iab i l ity,  [and] on  the 
whole they do not even approach the position of the national government under the Federal T0I1 
C laims Act."). 
1 58 .  ld. This tal ly includes only 48 states because Alaska and Hawaii were not admi tted to 
the Union until  1 959. 
1 59 .  ld. at 1 409.  
1 60. My discussion of the current landscape of state and local  i mmunities draws upon the 
survey of state and local immunity in  1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1 992) [hereinafter CIVIL ACTIONS)' 
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important restrictions remain. 1 62 State constitutions contain expl icit 
f . . . . Al  b 1 63 A k 1 64 d guarantees 0 state sovereIgn Immumty III a ama, r ansas an 
West Virginia . 1 65 Even in  states which have appreciably reduced the scope 
of state immunity, states ordinarily retain immunity with respect to 
government functions such as legislative, judicial . and pol i cymaking 
activities . 1 66 States that have waived tort immunity often carve out 
categories of activities for which they cannot be sued. 1 67 Many states l imit 
1 6 1 .  See Lauren K Robel ,  Sovereignty and Democracy: The States ' Obligations to Their 
Citizens Under Federal Statutory Law, 78 IND. LJ. 543, 545 (2003) (noting that "the last half 
century has seen a marked abandonment, both judicial and legislative, of sovereign immunity 
doctrines" in the states) . 
1 62 .  See Amelia A. Fogleman, Note, Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes: A Proposal for 
StatutolY Waiver for Tribal Businesses, 79 VA. L. REV. 1 345, 1 37 7-78 (noting that a number of 
states l imit  the type and/or amount of damages available against  state government defendants); 
Schlosser, supra note 1 20 ,  at 3 37 (" [M]OSL state tort c l aims acts expressly i mmunize the S tate 
from claims arising from normal governmental functions and exercises of d iscret ion.") .  
1 6 3 .  See A LA.  CONST. art. I, § 14 (prov iding "[t ]hat the S tate of Alabama shall never be 
made a defendant in any court of law or  el\uity" ) ;  L iberty Nat ' l  Life Ins .  Co. v .  Univ. of Ala.  
Heal th Servs.  Found. ,  P . c . ,  2003 WL 2 2 1 60893, at * 12 (Ala. Sept .  1 9 , 2003) (state government 
lacks authority to waive state sovereign i m muni ty) . 
1 64 .  See ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20 ("The S tate of  Arkansas shall never be made defendant in 
any of her courts ."); Smith v .  Denton, 895 S.W.2d 550,  5 5 5  (Ark. 1 995)  ( ' "The Arkansas 
Constitution prohibits awards of damages in lawsuits against the State of Arkansas and i ts 
i n stitutions.") (citation omitted). 
1 65 .  See W. VA . CONST. art. 6,  § 3 5 :  
The State of West Virginia sha l l  never be made defendant i n  any court of law or 
equity, except the S tate of West Virginia, including any subdivision thereof 
or any municipality therein, or any officer, agent or employee thereof, may be 
made defendant in any garnishment or attachment proceeding, as garnishee or 
suggestee. 
See also Shaffer v .  Stanley, 2003 WL 228 50002 , at [ l  (W. Va. Nov.  26, 2003) (s tate has 
constitutional immunity from damages su its ,  except that suit can be brought on c laims covered 
by state ' s  l iab i l i ty insurance); CIVIL ACTIONS, supra note 1 60,  § 1 .9, at 3 1  (d iscussing the 
Alabama, Arkansas, and West Virginia provisions). 
I ()6.  See, e.g, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN . � 1 2 -820.0 I (West 2003) (state or stale subdivi sion 
" shal l  not be l iable for acts and omissions of its employees constituting ei ther . . .  [t]he ex ercise 
of Cl jud i c iCl I  or legi slative function [or] [ t ]h e exercise of an administrative function involv ing the 
determinat ion of fundamental governmental po l i cy") .  As one treatise s tates: 
Al though the common-law doctrines of sovereign anel governmental 
immunity have been judicial ly abrogated in many jurisdictions, the courts 
which removed this obstacle to governmental tort l iab i l ity generally  
recognized that immunity would remain for functions that are essential ly  
governmental in nature, such as  judicial, legis lative, quasi-judicial, quasi­
legislative, and executive functions involving a high degree of discretion . . . .  
In addition, government tort c laims acts often contain exceptions to tort 
l iab i l i ty for governmental or discretionary functions. 
CIVIL ACTIONS,  supra note 1 60,  § 2: 1, at 83-84. 
1 67 .  See, e.g , IDAHO CODE § §  6-904, 6-904A, 6-904B (Michie 1 998) (excluding 
governmental l iab i l ity for certain types of actions); IND. CODE § 34- 1 3 -3-3 ( 1 976) (excluding 
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the amount of damages recoverable against a state defendant, 1 68 and many 
bar the imposition of punitive damages against a state. 1 69 Recent Supreme 
Court decisions protect states from abrogation of their immuni ty from suit 
under many federal laws, and only a few states have waived their immunity 
from such suits. 1 70 
This survey, then, discloses a mixed p icture . As Lauren Robe l  recent ly 
noted:  
from scope o f  government l iab i l i ty c laims ansmg from certain actIVIties, i n c luding "[t]he 
performance of a discretionary function"); MINN. STAT. § 3 . 736(3)  ( 1 997) ( l i s ting exclusions 
from state l iab i l i ty, including "loss caused by the performance or failure to perform a 
discretionary duty") ; MISS. CODE ANN . § 1 1 -46-9 ( 1 972) ( l isting exemptions from tort l iabi l i ty 
for state and local governments and their employees) ; N .J .  STAT. ANN. § 5 9 : 2-3 (West) ( 1 992) 
(exempting state and l ocal governments from l iabi l i ty for tort c laims arising fro m  legis lative or 
j udicial ac ts or "from the exercise of judgment or di scretion") ; S . c .  CODE ANN. � 1 5 -7 8-60 
( Law. Co-op. 2003) (exempting state and local governments from l iab i l i ty for tort c laims aris ing 
from, i n ter al ia,  legis lative or j ud icial acts or "the exerc ise of discretion or j udgment") . 
1 6 8 .  Sec, c.g. , COLO. REV. STAT. § 24- 1 0- 1 1 4  (2003) (setting presumptive cap on tort 
damages against state or local  governments of S 1 5 0,000 per person ancl S600.000 per 
occurrence, and providing that these l i mi ts may be raised by resolution or by l eg i s lative act ion 
in a particular case) ; IDAHO CODE § 6-926 (Michie 1 998) (capping state and l ocal governmental 
l iabi l ity for "personal i nj ury, death, or property damage" at $5 00,000 per oc currence unless 
l iabi l ity insurance has higher coverage l imit) ;  IND. CODE § 34- 1 3-3-4 ( 1 976) (capping 
governmeI1lal tort l iab i lity at $300,000 to 700,000 per person depending on when c la im accntes, 
and i mposing overal l  $5 ,000,000 cap per occurrence); M INN. STAT. § 3 . 736(4)(c) (2003) 
(capping state tort l iabi l ity at $ 1 ,000,000 per occurrence for claims arising in 2000 or later); 
M ISS .  CODF: ANN. § 1 1 -46- 1 5 ( l )(c) ( 1 972) (capping tort l iab i lity for state and local governments 
and their employees at $5 00,000 per occurren ce for c laims arising on or after July 1 , 200 1 ) ; Mo. 
REV.  STAT . § 5 3 7 . 6 1 0  (2000) (capping tort liab i l ity for state and "publ ic  entit ies" at  S2,000,000 
per occ urrence and $3 00,000 per person,  and providing for those caps to be indexed for 
i nflation) ; N.J .  STAT. ANN . § 5 9 : 9-2 (West \ 992)  (l i miting the avai lab i l ity of damages for pain 
and suffering in tort suits against state or local governments or their employees) . 
1 69 .  See, e.g. , ARlz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 2-820.04 (West 2003) ("Neither a publ ic  entity 
nor a publ ic  employee acting within the scope of his employment is l iab le for punit ive or 
exemp lary damages .") ;  CAL. GOV ' T  CUDE � 8 1 8  ( West 1 995) (barring award of exemplary 
damages against state or local  goveml1lc.:nt);  COLO. REV. STAT. § 24- 1 0- 1 1 4  (2003) (baning 
,l \vard o f  pu n i tive damages against state or  local governments); I DAHO CODE § 6-9 1 8  (Michie 
1 998) ("Governmental entities and their employees shal l not be liable  for puni t ive damages on 
any claim al lowed" under state tort c laims act);  IND. CODE § 34- 1 3 -3-4 (2003) ("A 
governmental entity or an employee of an governmental entity acting within the scope of 
employment i s  not  l iable for punitive damages" under state tort claims statute); MISS. CODE. 
ANN. § 1 1 -46- 1 5 (2 )  ( 1 972 )  (barring punitive damages and p rej udgment interest with respect to 
tort claims against state or local  governments and their employees); Mo. RE V. STAT. § 
5 3 7 . 6 1 0(3) (2000) (barring punitive damages i n  tort suits against a "publ ic  entity"); N.J .  STAT. 
ANN. § 5 9 : 9-2(c) (West 1 992) (barring punitive damages in tort suits against state or local  
governments) . 
1 70 .  See Robel ,  supra note 1 6 1 ,  at 5 5 8  n . 97 (discussing waivers by Minnesota and North 
Carolina). 
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Abrogation o f  immunity has not typically resulted i n  full 
l i abil i ty for all governmental violations of state l aw duties.  Indeed 
. . .  there are reasons to cal ibrate governmental l iab i lity in order to 
assure that discretionary dec isions are not overdeterred and that 
the state can plan for its fiscal responsibility. Blanket waivers of 
all immunity for all functions are not common. But bl anket 
assertions of immunity are even rarer, for the political real ities of 
turning away inj ured citizens are not appealing to many elected 
officials,  both j udicial and legislative. 1 7 1  
If  the pol itical realities in the states weigh in favor of expanded government 
l iab i lity, so too do the po litical realities facing tribal  governments. The next 
part assesses the l ikely impact of those rea lities on tribal  use of sovereign 
immunity. 
V. ASSESSMENT AND PREDICTION S CONCERNING TRIBAL SOVEREIGN 
IM M UNITY 
An irony of tribal sovereign immunity is that tribal governments have 
better j ust ifications for asserting sovereign immunity than the state or 
federal governments do, but also morc powerful reasons to waive it. 
Standard po licy arguments for sovereign immunity-such as fiscal  concerns 
or governmental "dignity"-are more l ikely to ring true with respect to 
tribal than nontribal governments . l 7 2 However, tribes face strong pressures 
to waive immunity. Tribes themselves have experienced-through their 
dealings with the federal and state governments-the effects of 
governmental denials of responsib i l ity. More immediate ly, the p l enary 
power doctrine p laces tribes in a po l itical ly vulnerable  position : Aggress ive 
tribal assertions of sovereign immunity may be adduced to support 
measures to l imit tribal immun ity or tribal governmental power more 
general ly.  Thus, it appears very likely that the tribes themselves wi l l  
cont i nue to extend the scope of remedies against tribal governments, 
p a rt i cu l ar ly in tribal courts . The provis ion of such remedies promotes 
1 7 1 .  1 d. at 558:' 
1 7 2 .  Other justifications for sovereign immunity have also been advanced, in addition to 
those discussed here .  See, e.g. , Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immun ity, 53 STAN. L. 
R E V .  1 20 1 ,  1 2 1 6  (200 1 )  (discussing and rejecting s ix possible rationales: "the i mportance of 
protecting government treasuries; separation of powers ; the absence of authority for suits 
against the government; the existence of adequate alternative remedies; a curb on bureaucratic 
powers; and tradition"). However, I focus on the notions discussed in the text-in particular, 
the government-finances rationale and the governmental-dignity rationale-because they are 
standard justifications for state i mmunity and they are also strongly applicable to tribal 
i mmunity. 
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governmental d ignity ; it may wel l  comport with tribal values concerning 
governmental accountab ility; and it wil l  in any event be driven by an 
awareness of the political pressures faced by the tribes .  Nonetheless ,  the 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity wil l  retain central importance because 
it wil l  enable tribes to l imit their waivers of immunity to tribal courts . The 
use of immunity as a forum-allocation device may help to reverse the 
effects of recent Indian law decisions that diminish the powers of triba l  . h 1 73 courts In ot er respects. 
As an initial matter, i t  is instructive to compare the strength of  
j ustifications for state and tribal immunity. Some might cavil at this 
comparison on the grounds that state sovereign immunity is constitutional ly 
protected whereas tribal sovereign immunity is  not mentioned in the 
Constitution. Such an objection is unpersuasive: Federal sovereign 
immunity is not mentioned in the Constitution either; 1 74 and though the 
Eleventh Amendment ' s  text constitutionalizes state immunity in a narrow 
subset of cases, the Court has extended the scope of state immunity wel l  
beyond that text. 1 75 Thus , to thc extent that the Court 's po li cy justifications 
1 73 .  To use terms fami l iar from the state sovereign i mmunity debate, tribal sovereign 
Immunity is, as a formal matter, an immunity-from-liabil i ty principle,  not merely a forum­
a l location principle .  Cf Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh A mendment Tmmunity, 1 06 
YALE LJ. 1 683 , 1 702 ( 1 997) (cons idering \vhdher E leventh Amendment i mmun ity is "on ly a n  
immuni ty from the original jurisdiction of  the federal courts, o r  . also (effec tively) a n  
immunity from l iab i l ity to individuals under federa l law"); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Sovereign 
fll7117 lin i(y, Dlie Process, and the Alden Trilogy, 1 09 YALE L.J .  1 927, 1 93 0  ( 2000 ) (arguing that 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S .  706 ( 1 999). "implici t ly adopted . . .  the ' immu n i ty-from-liab i l i ty '  
i n terpretation," but that Florida Prepaid Postsecondmy Education Expense Board v .  College 
Savings Bank, 527 U.S .  627 ( 1 999), constitutes "a part ia l  resurrection of the forum-allocation 
regime"). However, I argue here that, in l ight of the pressures on tribes to waive immun i ty ,  
tribal  sovereign immunity i s  more l ikely to function, in the long run ,  as  a forum-al location 
principle .  
1 74 .  See Se ieistad, supra note 2, at 670 ("The principle that the United State:; may not be 
s Lled absent express authorizati on by Congress has been firmly estab l i shed (l S CI  matter of federal 
common law. The fundamental legal bas is  for its existence in the common law, however, is less 
c lear.") ;  Jackson, supra note 8.5 ,  at .5 2 3  (not ing lhat federal sovereign immun ily " is  nowhere 
explicit ly set forth in the Consti tution") .  
1 75 .  The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States 
shal l  not be constmed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by Citi zens of another State, or by Ci tizens or Subj ects of any Foreign 
State ." U .S .  CONST. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has extended state sovereign immuni ty to 
suits not mentioned in the Amendment, such as suits brought against a state by its own citizens, 
see Hans v. Louisiana, 1 34 U.S .  1 , 4, 2 1  ( 1 890), suits brought by a foreign state, see Monaco v .  
Miss issippi, 292 U . S .  3 1 3 ,  329-30 ( 1 934), suits brought b y  a n  Indian tribe, see Blatchford v .  
Native V i l l .  of  Noatak, 50 1 U . S .  775 ,  779 ,  782  ( 1 99 1 ), and suits brought in state court, see 
A lden v. Maine, 527 U.S .  706, 7 1 2  ( 1 999). 
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for state immunity are at al l  persuasive, they may also serve to j ustify tribal . .  . 1 76 sovereIgn Immumty. 
A standard rationale for state sovereign i mmunity is the protection of 
the state ' s  treasury. l 77 Ann Althouse has pointed out that states "cannot, 
l ike a private entity, s imply go out of business," and that l arge retrospective 
damages awards could "sap the states '  abi l ity to serve other important 
publ ic  needs. , , 1 78 Though commentators have persuas ive ly crit icized the 
notion that immuni ty is necessary in order to protect a state ' s  finances,  such 
an argument seems much more plaus ible with respect to tribes . 1 79 Despite 
the wel l-publ icized successes of a handful of tribes, most tribes are sti l l  
stnlggl ing economical ly . 1 80 It seems qui te possible that many Indian tribes 
would risk insolvency if they were subj ected to huge damage awards. 1 8 1  
1 76.  Judith Resnik has cautioned that comparisons between state sovereignty and tribal 
sovere ignty can be misleading: 
At least in  theory, states have entered into a compact, called the Uni ted 
S tates Constitution, and wi l l fu l ly  ceded powers to a central governmen t .  At 
least in theory, s tates pal1 ic ipate via their representatives in Congress in the 
dec isions of the national government. Such cla ims cannot be made , even in 
theory , for the Indian tribes, whose representatives neither signed the 
Constitution nor s i t  in Congress. 
Resnik, supra note 3, at 680.  Nonetheless, in  l ight of the cunent Court ' s  w i l l ingness to go 
beyond the constitutional text in order to infer constitutional sovereign immunity protections for 
states,  it i s  significant to note that the policy jus t i fications for tribal immunity are stronger than 
those for s tate immunity. 
1 7 7. See Hess v.  Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp . ,  5 1 3 U .S .  30 , 48 ( 1 994) (stat ing that "the 
i l l lpdUS for the E leventh Amendment [ i s l  the prevention of federal-co1lI1 judgments that must 
be paid out of a S tate's treasury"). 
1 78 .  Ann A lthouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court's New Federalism, 68 
U .  CI . L. REV . 245 , 266 (2000). 
1 7 9. See, e.g. , F ogieman, supra note 1 62 ,  at 1 349 ("Courts and commen ta tors have j L1stified 
the continued existence of tribal sovereign immunity pr imarily as a means to protect scarce 
tribal resources.") .  
1 8 0 .  See S tephen E .  Cornell 8.: J oseph I ' .  Kalt ,  SuccesJiit! Ecollolllic Development (fnd 
f-Iclaogel leily of Go vernlllentul Form on A merican Illdioll Rcscrvariol ls , i l l  G r:TTJ�G GOOD 
GOVERNMENT: CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE PUBLIC SECTORS OF DEVELOPI0.'C; COU:\TR I ES 2 6 1  
(iVkri lee S .  Grindle ed . ,  1 997) ("At present, American Indian c i t izens on  the nat ion's  more than 
300 reservations an; the poorest minority in the Un ited States. Reservations are commonly 
characterized by severe unemployment and attendant social and economic symptoms of 
poverty .") ;  Eric Governo, Comment, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: History, Competing Policies, 
and Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg .  Techs . ,  Inc . ,  34 NEW ENG. L .  REv. 1 75 ,  204 ( 1 999) (noting 
the argument that "tribes' financial frailty, l imited resources, and l imited taxing power justify 
sovereign immunity"). 
1 8 1 .  See Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1 058 ,  1 073 
( 1 982) ("Unlike other governmental bodies, Indian tribes would  find the loss of assets more 
difficult to replace because tribes have only a l imited revenue base over which to spread any 
losses . ") .  
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Simi larly, in the context of suits arising from a government ' s  
commercial enterprises, the arguments for tribal  immunity seem stronger 
than those for state immunity .  As noted above, the Court in Kiowa Tribe 
questioned whether a tribe should have immunity for its activities in 
interstate commerce; the Court suggested that tribes have less c laim to 
immunity when they "take part in the Nation's commerce . , , ] 82 By contrast, 
a majority of the current Court maintains that state sovereign immunity 
extends to the states '  commercial activities. Responding to this notion, four 
members of  the Court have argued that Congress should be  able to 
condition states ' partic ipation in interstate commerce on a waiver of  
immunity : "When a State engages in  ordinary commercial ventures , i t  acts 
l ike a private person, outside the area of its ' core ' responsibi l ities , and in a 
way unlikely to prove essentia l  to the fulfi l lment of a basic governmental 
obligation. , , 1 83 This may wel l  be true for states ;  they can raise revenue 
through taxes . 1 84 But few tribes have any significant tax base. Tribal 
business enterprises may be the on ly means by whieh a tribe can raise 
revenues-and thus such enterprises may be essential to the fulfi l lment of 
the tribe ' s  governmental bbligations. I �5 
1 82 .  Kiowa Tribe v .  Mfg . Techs . ,  Inc . ,  .523 U . S .  75 1 ,  7 58  ( 1 998).  
1 83 .  Call .  Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. , 527 U . S .  666.  694 
( 1 999) (Breyer, J . ,  joined by Stevens, Souter & G insburg , JJ . ,  dissen t ing) . 
1 84 .  S i m i l arly , foreign states can raise revenue through means other than commerc ia l  
venture s ;  thus , the exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") fo r a foreign 
state ' s commercial ac tivities, see 28 U .S . c . § 1 60 .5 ( a )(2) (2000),  has much less effec t  on foreign 
s tates than would be produced by a s imi lar ex cept ion to tri bal soverei gn immun i ty . This i s 
parti cularly true b ecau se tribes' l imited geograph ic territories, their location with in  the Un i ted 
States '  boundaries,  and their often l imited intemal economic resources make it part icular ly 
likely that tribal enterprises must engage i n  external commerce in order to succeed. Cf S teve E .  
Dietrich, Tribal Rl Isinesses and the Uncertain Reach of Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A SratlllOlY 
Soluliun, 67 WAS H .  L .  REv. 1 1 3 ,  1 3 1 ( 1 992) (advocating tribal sovereign immu n i ty w i th respect 
to o ff-reservation act iviti es because, inter ali a , " many reservati ons have very l i tt le  l and" 
( footnote o m i t ted) . For these reasons, a n a lyses that would model tribal i mmunity pol icy on the 
F S [ f\  are less than ful ly  p ersuas i ve . See, e.g. , John W. Borchert , Commcnt,  Tribo! !fi llllllllity 
TlZl'uug/i tlie Lens of the Foreigll Sovereigll i!!1lJ1l1l7itics ,kl: A Worl'Cll lf for Codijicolil l l l l ,  I ,  
C�!ORY I\:T 'L  L .  REV. 247, 2 8 1  ( 1 999) (argui n g  that  "[t]he law of fore i g n  sovere i g n  i mmun i ties  
can scrve as a powerful gu ide as Co ngress cont i nues to consider legis lative p roposals " 
concern i ng tri b a l  sovereign immunity);  J u l ie A.  Clemen t , Comment, Strengthening Autunorny 
by Waiving Sovereign Immunity: Why Indian Tribes Should Be "Foreign " Under [he Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 1 4  T.M.  COOLEY L. REV. 653 , 683 ( 1 997) (arguing that Congress 
should "[ e ] xtend[] the FSIA to Indian tribes") . 
1 85 .  As Lorie Graham has explained: 
The Kiowa Court . . .  fai l [  ed] to understand the important connection 
between tribal self-governance and tribal enterprises. Tribal  governments are 
responsible for providing services to their constituencies, such as health, 
education, law enforcement, and housing, to name a few. Most sovereigns 
levy taxes to pay for these essential governmental functions. Yet the broad 
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The Supreme Court 's  argument concerning · the connection between 
sovereign immunity and sovereign dignity-which is puzzl ing when 
invoked in connection with states l 86-seems more persuasive in connection 
with tribes . Judith Resnik and Julie Chi-hye Suk have recently noted "the 
util ity of institutional dignity, enabling a fledgling organization-be it a 
court or a nation-to function. , , ' 87 The governmental authority of the states 
is wel l  estab lished and unquestioned. By contrast, tribes-in part as a result 
of the past two centuries of federal Indian policy-constantly face 
chal lenges to their authority to function as governments. 1 88 Though Resnik 
and S uk conc lude that institutional d ignity concerns fai l  to justify sovereign 
immunity, ' 89 one could argue that to the extent that sovereign immunity 
promotes the recognition o f  tribes as sovereign entities, it can promote their 
abi l ity to function as such. This is particularly true in the l ight of  the 
sovereign immunity of the state and federal governments : I f  states and the 
federal government possess such immunity, the denial  of immunity to tribes 
might suggest, by comparison, that tribes are not true governmental 
authorit ies .  1 90 
array of taxes avai lab le  to state and local go vernments are no t as readi ly 
ava i lab le to  tribes. Indeed, cases such as  [Atkinson Trading Co. v .  Shirley, 
5 3 2  U.S .  64:' (200 1 )] which limit a tri be ' s abi lity to tax nonmember 
commercial en terprises located within the reservation, severely restrict a 
tr ibe's abi l i ty to raise governmental revenue through taxation. Thus, tribes 
have had to rely on other revenue streams to meet their governmental 
responsibi l i t ies,  most notably  commercial en terprises . 
Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Sovereignty Throllgh Agreement, 37 NEW ENG . L. REV. 523,  
5 3 3-34 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
1 86 .  See A l thouse , supra note 1 7 8 ,  at 250 (arguing that the current Court ' s  "ins istence on  
' dignity' for the states sounds l ike . . .  ' b l ind deference to "States Rights""'); Evan H .  
Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 5 7 4  ANNALS AM . ACAD. POL.  & SOc . S C I .  8 1 ,  
9 1  (200 I )  ("To the extent i t  is designed to serve expressive purposes, a b lanket ru l e o f  s tate 
sovereign i mmuni ty rests on a fl imsy foundat ion .") ;  Daniel J .  Meltzer, State Sovereign 
Immunity: Five A urhors in Search of a TheOty, 75 . fOTR E DAME L .  REV. 1 0  1 1 , 1 040 (2000) 
(noting that " b road nOl ions of state d ign i ty are d i t11 cu l t  to square with accepted features of 
constitu t i o n a l  1 rae! i [ ion " ) 
1 87 .  Judith Resn ik & Ju l ie C h i-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injllly: Questioning the Role of 
Dignity in Conceplions a/Sovereignty, 5 5  STA N. L. RF-v. 1 92 1 , 1 92 7  (2003) .  
1 88 .  Cf id. a t 1946 (noting that "First Nations and i ndigenous peoples today tum t o  the 
concept of digni ty to claim pol i tical  capital"). 
1 89 .  See id at 1 92 8 ;  see also infra notes 2 1 5- 1 6  and accompanying text. 
1 90.  It is true that the immunity of fore ign governments has been limited by the FSIA .  
However, foreign sovereign immunity is l i kely to be  much less salient, t o  most domestic 
observers, than state or federal sovereign i mmunity, so the most meaningful comparison, 
arguably, i s  between states, the federal government, and tribes.  It is also true that local 
governments possess no constitutional immunity from suit ;  but l ikening tribal governments to 
local governments would be misleading because, among other reasons, local governments 
general ly have been viewed as creatures of state law. 
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Such considerations might support the notion that tribes have more 
cause than other governments to retain a robust doctrine of sovereign 
immunity . However, tribes also have reason to be sharp ly aware of the 
injustices that can result from such immunity. Sovereign immunity bothers 
us "because what counts . . .  is not reason but force, not law but power, not 
orderly adjudication but physical taking by the stronger party. , , 1 9 1  If  
unchecked assertions of government power render sovereign immunity 
repugnant, they also scar the h istory of federal relations with the Indian 
tribes . l 92 Recall Chief Justice Marsha l l ' s  justification of  the doctrine of 
d iscovery : " [PJower, war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, 
are conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by those 
on whom they descend. , , 1 93 With respect to many tribes, the notion of 
federal conquest is apocryphal ;  1 94 but the doctrine of  federal plenary power 
over tribal affairs is  a reality which a l l  tribes must face.  Part I discussed the 
troubl ing ongms of that doctrine ; it developed from a perverse 
misconstruction of the United States ' tmst responsibi l ity to the tribes, and it 
was imposed without regard to any notion of tribal consent. 1 95 The pages of 
the United States Reports ,  moreover, are replete with assertions that tribes, 
1 9 l .  Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Mus t Go, 22 ADMIN. 1.  REV.  3 8 3,  3 9 2 
( 1 970) (c:mphasis omitted) . An excel lent article by Andrea Seielstad drew my attention to this 
quote , though the art ic le did not exp l ic it ly draw the connection between Dav i s '  description of 
sovereign immunity and the assertion of federal power over Indian tribes . See Seiels tad, s upra 
note 2, at 767.  
1 92 .  As Judith Resnik observes :  "The United States had the phys ical power and used it. By 
vi rtue of force, the federal government took land, removed people from their homes, attempted 
to dissuade them from observing their cllstoms, and i mposed its ru le ." Resn ik,  supra note 3, at 
692 (footnotes omitted). 
1 9 3 .  Worcester v. Georgia, 3 1  U . S .  5 1 5 , 543 ( 1 832).  
1 94 .  See Clinton, supra note 7 .  at 1 65 ("Contrary to the great American myth . . .  actual 
conquest was not the basis for most of the pacification of the tribes during [the 1 8 60s to 
1 8 8 0s] .")  (footnote omitted) ; cf Steven Paul McS loy, "Because the Bible Tells Af'e So ": 
!'vioni/est Destiny and A merican Indians, 9 ST. THOMAS 1 .  REV. 3 7 ,  3 8  ( 1 990) ("The real 
conquest was on paper, on maps ami in lav" s. What those maps showed a n d  thosl: I,m s said was 
[hat Tmlians had been ' conquered'  merely by be ing ' d isc overed ' ' ') . 
1 9 5 .  See Cl inton, supra note 7 .  at 1 1 5 (argu ing that "there is no acceptable ,  historically 
derived, textual constitutional explanation for the exercise of any federal authority over Indian 
tribes without their consent manifested through treaty") ; Resnik, supra note 3 ,  at 693 ("No 
consent of the governed (not even weak versions of consent theory) can be offered in support of  
the authority exercised by ' the federal system' over Indian tribes."). In more recent decades, the 
Court has suggested that federal power over Indian tribes flows from the Indian Commerce 
C lause. See C linton, supra note 7 ,  at 1 95-96 .  This rationale, too, is questionable.  See id. at 
1 96 (arguing that since the Court now grounds federal power i n  the Indian Commerce Clause, 
"the Indian plenary power doctrine should disappear in favor of a searching textual and 
h istorical inquiry into the l imits of Indian Commerce Clause power, not unlike the simi lar 
inquiry recently undertaken by the Court with reference to the l imitations on Interstate 
Commerce Clause power") . 
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if they have been wronged by the United States , must seek rel ief from the 
political branches of the federal government, not from the courtS . I 96 Even 
after the United States waived its sovereign immunity with respect to tribal 
1 ·  1 97 'b f h b 1 "  d . 1 d ' 1 98 c alms , tn es 0 ten ave een Imite to mcomp ete reme Ies. 
Moreover, some actions are beyond the l imits of redress :  Even if the courts 
were inclined to provide relief, what remedy would compensate for federal 
law's  reduction of tribal governmental authority? The hi story o f  federal 
relations with the tribes , then, vividly i l lustrates the denial of judicial 
remedies , at worst, or the provision of imperfect remedies , at best. 
In addition to harms inflicted by the federal government, many tribes 
suffered wrongdoing by state governments . A number of states , for 
example,  acquired huge tracts of tribal l ands in violation of  federal law. 
Current state sovereign immunity doctrine prevents tribes from suing states 
for most types of relief concerning these violations, 1 99 unless the federal 
1 96. See, e.g. , Lone Wolf  v .  H i tchcock, 1 87 U.S .  553 ,  568 ( 1 903) ("if injury was 
occasioned, which we do not wish to be understood as implying,  by the use made by Congress 
of its power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress,  and not to the courts .") .  
1 97 .  The current waiver with respect to tribal claims for damages-the Indian Tucker 
Act-is codi fied at 28 U .S .c .  § 1 5 05 (2000) . As the Supreme Court recently explained, 
[a] lthough the Indian Tucker Act confers j uri sdiction upon the Court of 
Federal Claims,  i t  is  not i tself a source of substantive r ights .  To state a 
l itigable c la im,  a tribal plaintiff must i nvoke a rights-creating source of 
substantive law that "can fairly  be interpreted as mandating compensation by 
the Federal Government for the damages sustained." Because "[t]he [Indian] 
Tucker Act itself provides the necessary consent" to su it ,  however, the 
rights-creating statute or regulat ion need not contain "a second waiver of 
sovere ign immunity." 
United States v .  Navajo Nation, 5 3 7  U.S. 488, 503 (2003) (ci tations omitted) (quoting United 
S tates v. Mitchell ,  463 U .S .  206, 2 1 8- 1 9  ( 1 983)) .  
1 98 .  See Steven Paul McS loy, Revisiting the "Courts Ol The Conqueror": American Indian 
Claims Against the United States, 44 AM. U .  L .  REV. 5 3 7 ,  544-45 ( 1 994) (noting instances in 
which tribal l itigants lost due to narrow interpretations of the federal trust obligation and/or 
"stric t  constntetion of the United States' waiver of i ts sovere ign immunity"); but see Newton, 
supra note 59, at 232 33  l " [ I ] n  modern day Indian law, lhe trust re lat ionship, al though not 
constitut iona l ly based ::1I1e1 thus not enforceable against CUllg lt.:SS, i s  a source of enforceable 
rights against the execu tive branch and has become a major  weapon in the arsena l  of i ndian 
rights ." (footnote omitted)) . 
1 99 .  See Seminoh:: Tribe of F la. v. F lorida, 5 1 7  U.S .  44, 72-73 ( 1 996) (holding that the 
Indian Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity) ; 
B latchford v .  Native Vi i I .  of Noatak, 5 0 1  U . S .  775 ,  782  ( 1 99 1 )  (holding that states retain 
sovereign immunity from suits by Indian tribes).  The Court reasoned in Blatchford that states 
would not have rati fied the Constitution if it had abrogated state immunity from tribal suits 
because there would have been a lack of "mutual ity," in that the Constitution does not  abrogate 
tribal immuni ty from suits by states. See Blatchford, 5 0 1  U.S .  at 7 82. This reasoning might 
lead one to question the holding in  Seminole Tribe: If the Constitution somehow empowers 
Congress to abrogate tribal immunity, as the Court has indicated, then (at least as far as the 
mutuality rationale is concerned) it seems p lausible also to i nfer that the Constitution empowers 
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government joins in  the suit as a p laintiff.2oo In this connection, it is  
noteworthy that state sovereign immunity doctrines affect tribal land c laims 
more drastical ly than many other types of c laims.20 1 Because many land 
c laims assert deprivations of tribal  l and dating back wel l  over a cenhlry, 
retrospective damages constitute a large part of the potential recovery-but 
state immunity bars a tribe 's  recovery of damages unless the United States 
sues as co-plaintiff. Apart from damages rel ief, some land c laims seek both 
possession of l and currently held by the state and a dec laration that the state 
lacks regulatory authority over that land-but after the Court ' s  recent 
decision in Idaho v. Coeur d 'Alene Tribe of Idaho,202 this type of rel ief 
l ikely cannot be sought against state officials under Ex parte Young,203 and 
thus such relief wi l l  l ikely be barred by state immunity unless the United 
S . . h . 204 tates Joms t e smt. 
Tribes, then, continue to be denied ful l  rel ief for violations of their 
rights by the state and federal governments. The tribes ' experience in  this 
regard i l lustrates the halmfu l  effects of governmental immunity-though it 
m ight, as we l l ,  cause some tribes to wonder why they should provide ful l  
remedies whi le  continuing to suffer from the denial  o f  such remedies by 
other governments. H owever, other considerations are l ike ly to weigh even 
more heavily in tribes ' current calculus. In particular, tribes are subj ect to 
s ignificant pol it ical pressure to reduce the scope of tribal sovere ign 
immunity .  
As with state sovereign immunity, tribal sovereign immunity l imits the 
remedies available for governmental violations of law, but it does not 
change the underlying legal obl igations of the government in question.  
Take, for example ,  the ICRA. Critics have charged that the lCRA imposes 
upon Indian nations both a general model of individual rights against 
government that is  fore ign to the community-oriented value systems of 
some tribes , and spec ific obligations that may conflict with a paI1icular 
tribe ' s  traditional values . 205 These concerns make some commentators 
Congress to abrogate state i m mu n ity from tribal su i ts .  However. the: C01 1rt has shown no 
incl ination to explore th is  l ine  of reason i ng. 
200. See Catherine T.  Stntve, Raising Arizona: Reflections 017 Sovereigllly alld th e Nature 
of the PlaintijJin Federal Sliits Against States, 6 1  MONT. L. REV . 1 05 ,  1 1 0 (2000) .  
20 l .  See Catherine T. Stntve, Turf Struggles: Land, Sovereignty, and Sovereign inzmuniey, 
37 NEW ENG. L. REv. 5 7 1  (2003 ) .  
202 .  52 1 U.S .  26 1 ( 1 997) .  
203.  209 U.S .  1 23 ( 1 908) .  
204 .  See Struve, supra note 20 1 ,  a t  577-80. 
205 .  See Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L . J .  
889, 90 1 (2003) (noting that "[c]ritics of the Indian Civi l  R ights Act . . .  condemn the Act for 
i ntroducing an al ien culture of rights that undermines tribal social organization and value 
systems"). 
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ambivalent about the ICRA: they support its protection of  individual rights 
against, for example, sex discrimination, but they recognize that the creation 
of such rights may interfere with the traditions of some rribes .206 As Judith 
Resnik has noted, the debate over the ICRA is a debate over how much 
difference the federal system wi l l  tolerate within the United States '  
borders. 207 
Because Martinez-the decision that has sparked much scholarly 
debate over the ICRA-ultimately turned upon the existence of  a cause of 
action and the avail ab i lity of relief against tribal government defendants , 
discussions of the permissibi l ity of tribal difference from federa l c ivi l  rights 
norms sometimes are couched as debates over triba l  sovereign immunity. 
Ul timately, such a focus misses the mark. The existence of tribal immunity 
does not alter Congress '  underlying decision to subject tribes to federal civil 
rights law.  Once it is  conceded that Congress has the authority to create 
ICRA rights, the debate becomes focused on the question of the extent to 
which individuals can enforce those rights against trioal  governments . 
Tribal immunity does not change the rights-based focus of  the q uestion; it 
mere ly permits tribes to l imit the availabi l ity of remedies for the violation 
of those rights . This p laces tribes in a rhetorica l ly weak posit ion:  to the 
extent that the question is presented as the extent o f  remedies for violations 
of concededly valid rights, a tribe that denies a l l  such remedies could be 
seen as resisting the rule of law . As a practical matter, in the short term, 
triba l  immunity might shie ld tribes from enforcement by non-tribal courts 
of requirements imposed in laws like the ICRA. In the longer run, however, 
tribes wil l  face increasing pressure to provide remedies in tribal court for 
vio lations of those laws . 
One explanation of the continued assertion of  immunity by the state 
and federal governments is that, as ide from publ ic  opinion and 
considerations of justice , there is l ittl e  pressure for those governments to 
waive immunity complete ly .  For example , because state i mmunity is in 
most instances constitutional ly protected from congressiona l  abrogation,208 
206 .  See Resnik, supra note 3 ,  at 72 7 ("For those of us who bel ieve in 'Nomen ' s  rights and 
are also concerned a,bout federal government imperiali sm, the [Alfartinez] case becomes hard ."); 
see also CATHARINE A.  MACKINNON, FEMIN ISM UNMODIFI ED : DI SCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
66 ( 1 987) (" I find Martinez a difficult case on a lot of levels, and I don ' t  usually find cases 
difficult .");  id. at 69 ("Since when is male supremacy a tribal tradition? For at least some tribes, 
since contact with European whites."). 
207 . See Resnik, supra note 3 ,  at  75 1 ("If the word ' sovereign' has any meaning in 
contemporary federal courts ' j urisprudence, i ts meaning comes from a state ' s  or a tribe ' s  abi li ty 
to maintain d ifferent modes from those of the federal government."). 
208. Congress ' s  Article I powers do not authorize i t  to abrogate state sovereign immunity 
from suit. See Alden v .  Maine, 527 U .S .  706, 7 1 2  ( 1 999); Seminole Tribe of F la .  v. F lorida, 5 1 7  
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the aggressive use of state immunity ordinari ly wil l  not trigger a reduction 
of that immunity.209 Likewise , though Congress can subj ect states to a 
broad range of regulation, Congress neither could nor would remove the 
states ' general ability to perform basic governmental functions (such as 
asserting legis lative and adjudicative jurisdiction over persons within their 
borders) .  States can assert sovereign immunity without concern that such 
an assertion wil l trigger congressional reductions in other aspects of state 
authority. Thus , the Court ' s  expansive doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity-especially when combined with other doctrines concerning state 
and local government l iabi lity-provides states with significant protection 
from the full cost of violating federal law.2 l o  
By contrast, the recurrent political pressure for Congress to  abrogate or  
l imit tribal  immunity provides a strong incentive for tribes proactively  to 
limit their own immunity? l l Even isolated denials of remedies by a handful  
U . S .  4 4 ,  7 2-73 ( 1 996).  Congress may abrogate state so\ crcign immun ity in  the exercise o f  its 
enforcement authority under the Reconstruction Amendments, see, e.g. , Fi tzpatrick v. B i tzer, 
427 U.S .  4 4 5 ,  456 ( 1 976) ,  but only if  Congress is acti ng within the scope of i ts authori ty to 
enforce the relevant amendment, see, e.g. , Bd. of Trs. of the Univ .  of Ala .  v. Garrett, 53 1 U . S .  
3 5 6, 3 74 (200 1 ) ("[ I ]n  order to authorize private individuals t o  recover money damages against 
the States, there must be a pattern of discr imination by the S tates which violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the 
targeted violat ion .") .  
209 .  In  at  least some instances, states'  denials of remedies for states'  violations of l iberty or 
property rights could trigger a val id abrogation of state sovere ign immunity pursuant to 
Congress'  enforcement  power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth A mendment. See Carlos 
Manuel Vazquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the A lden Trilogy, 1 09 YALE LJ. 
1 9 2 7 , 1 954- 5 5  (2000). 
2 1 0 . See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. ,  The "Conservotive " Paths of the Rehnquist Court 's 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U .  CHI. L. REv. 429, 483 (2002) (noting that the Court 's "pro­
federalism majority is pursuing a multi-front battle against suits for damages that d isrupt state 
and local governments' budgets and p lanning processes: the states are protected by sovere ign 
immunity, whi l e  local governments achieve considerah le (although not total) protection from 
the Court ' s  cOlbtrual ot statutory standards for governmen tal l iab i l i ty").  Admitted ly, th ere s t i l l  
exists some pressure fo r states to  comply with the requ i rements o f  federal law, even i n  the  
absence of private suits for damages. See Mark Tushnet, A larmism Versus Moderation in 
Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L .J. 47 ,  50 (2003) (noting, in addi t ion to the 
possib i l ity of federal enforcement suits and suits for injunct i  ve relief under Ex porte Young, that 
"in many instances, state governments face substantial pol i tical pressure to compiy wi th 
national law"). 
2 1 l .  See Fogleman, supra note 1 62,  at 1 3 5 7  ("If tribes continue to assert and courts 
continue to uphold absolute sovereign immunity, Congress wil l  l ikely face even greater 
demands from the public, l egal community, and other branches of government to waive at least 
some of the tribes ' immuni ty.") ; Limas, supra note 1 30, at 3 8 7 ;  Seielstad, supra note 2 ,  at 726-
2 7  (discussing a b i l l  proposed by  former Senator S lade Gorton that would  have abrogated triba l  
sovereign immunity); WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 2,  at  2 3 7-45 (discussing former 
Senator Gorton' s  proposals concerning tribal sovereign immunity) . 
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of tribes can lend momentum to campaigns for l imits on tribal  immunity;2 1 2 
although congressional abrogation of a ll tribal  immunity would not be a 
proportionate response to denials of redress by a few tribes,2 1 3  tribes are 
j ustifiab ly concerned that such denials of remedies could spur congressional 
action . Likewise , the prospect of continued Supreme Court incursions on 
other aspects of tribal sovereignty also provides an incentive for tribes to 
provide effective tribal-court remedies against tribal govelnments : The 
more that tribes make c lear that such remedies are available for the misuse 
of governmental power, the less l ikely the Supreme Court may be to further 
1 ·  . h f h ? 1 4  1mlt t e scope 0 . t at power.-
In many tribes, tradition may a lready support the notion that 
government should account for its actions to those whom it affects. 
Moreover, a tribe ' s  expansion of remedies against governmental 
misconduct wi l l  contribute to, not detract from, governmental dignity . As 
Resnik and Suk cxplain, "[rJather than being conceived to be insulting or 
humil iating, the very practice of  adjudication should be seen as a form of 
recognition of the status of democratic sovereigns, committed to renewing 
2 1 2 .  See Seielstad, supra note 2, at 729-35 (discussing testimony at congressional hearings 
on tribal sovereign immunity dur i ng the late 1 990s). 
2 1 3 . See Seie lstad, sZlpra note 2,  at 742 (noting that "efforts to amend or reform the entire 
federal l aw regarding Ind ian nations and their relationship with states and the federal 
government are driven by very few examples-often the most extreme or dysfunctional among 
them-drawn from a very small sampl ing of tribal governments") . 
2 1 4. Robert Laurence has maue a simi lar argument with respect to the Court ' s  holding, in 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. lv[arlinez, that [CRA rights are not enforceable in non-tribal COUlt other 
than through habeas rev ie\v .  Laurel lce draws a connection between lvlartinez and the Court 's  
hold ing, in  Oliphant v. 5;uq llamish [ndian Tribe, that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non­
Indians :  "If lv/arfinez had come out the other way, the result in  Oliphant might have been 
different. The essence of Oliphant ' s  complaint was, or ought to be, that he is being treated-or 
potentially was being treated-unfairly. The lCRA is the check on tribal unfairness. Martinez 
cut back substantial ly on the reach of the leRA." Robert Laurence, A QlIincentennial Essay on 
Martinez v .  Santa C lara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REV . 307, 338 ( 1 99 1 -92) (footnote omitted). (As 
Laurence notes, the causa l  l i nk is not d irect :  the C ourt dec i ded Oliphant shortly before it 
decided Marlinez, and in  a l lY  event a person who was convicted hy a tri bal court \vould be able 
to seek habeas re l ief in federal court under the ICRA, even after AJartinez. See id a t  338 n. 1 29 ;  
see also Robert Laurence, Mart i nez, Oliphant Clnd Federal Caliri Review uf Tribal Activity 
Under the Indian Civil R ights Act, 1 0  CAM PBELL L. REv . 4 1 1 , 4 1 8- 1 9  ( 1 988) ("[G] iven that the 
[lCRA] contains a habe�s corpus provision and given further [hat Mark Ol iphant was being 
'detained' by the tribe, it would have been perfectly appropriate under the ICRA as i t  exists 
today for a federal court to examine his treatment by the tribe.") (footnote omitted).) 
Ernest Young has made a somewhat analogous point with respect to state sovereign 
immuni ty:  "[E]rosion of the states '  accountab i lity to federal requirements may discourage the 
further devolution of federal authority to the state level .  Rhetorically speaking, it may tend to 
b lunt the force of arguments that power must be returned to more accountable  state 
governments if those governments become, wel l ,  less accountable." Ernest A. Young, State 
Sovereign Immunity and the Future uf Federalism, 1 999 SUP. CT. REv. 1 , 63 .  
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their authority through processes of  communication and mutual consent. , ,2 1 5 
Resnik and Suk conc lude, accordingly, that dignity concerns cannot j ustify 
sovereign immunity, though they note that such concerns might support 
limiting the range of avai lable remedies or providing special methods of 
adjudication. 2 1 6  Tribes , in this view, can best promote their recognition as 
true sovereigns by providing meaningful remedies for valid claims.2 1 7  For 
a l l  these reasons, it seems likely that tribes will continue to expand the 
availabi l ity of remedies against governmental defendants.l l 8  
Thus, as seen in Part I I I , in many instances tribal immunity serves not 
so much to bar a p laintiffs  recovery as to limit the fora in which the 
p laintiff can sue and to regulate the nature and scope of the remedies 
available .  By waiving immunity from suit in tribal court, but not elsewhere , 
a tribe can provide accountabi lity for governmental behavior while 
simultaneously reinforcing the authority of tribal courts and providing those 
courts with the opportunity to develop the substantive law in ways that 
reflect the tribe ' s  norms .2 1 9 A tribal cOUl1 may be better ab le to adapt civil 
rights or other laws to fit  the preexisting values of the tribe,220 and the 
2 1 5 . Resnik & Suk, supro note 1 87 ,  at 1 928 .  
2 1 6 . See id. at  1 928 .  
2 1 7 . See Seielstad, Slipm no te 2 ,  at 668-69 (urging Indian tribes " to  take advantage of the 
current state of the law regarding tribal immunity and continue to enhance their legitimacy and 
powers of self-governing by developing and strengthening appropriate remedies for tribal 
members and others to obtain redress for disputes with tribal governments") . 
2 1 8 . See Pommersheim,  supra note l 3 2 ,  at 23 (noting that civi l  rights l i t igation in tribal 
courts, "along with tribal legislative initiatives, wi l l  likely fu rther l imit the range and 
appl icabi lity of the ancient, western doctrine of sovereign immunity"). 
2 1 9 . See Seielstad, sup/'(! note 2,  at 770 (noting that "tribal immunity assists tribes in 
continuing to strengthen and develop their legal systems, re-infusing them where appropriate 
with traditional norms and processes that may have been e liminated through the federal 
government's colon ization of tribal justice systems"). In some instances, tribal immunity may 
actual ly aid the extension of civi l  rights and other protections by tribal courts . For example, a 
court may be more wi l l ing to find that a tribal action violated the appl icab le law if only 
prospective remedies are ava i lable for [hat violation. Prospec tive re l ief can enforce tribal 
compliance wi th [he law \v b i le protec ting scarce tribal re s o ur c e s  from brge retrospective 
damages awards. Cj John C. Jeffries, Jr. , Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 
1 09 YALE L.J.  87 , 90 ( 1 999) (arguing that "the right-remedy gap in constitutional torts 
faci l i tates constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation") . 
220. Robert McCarthy 's recent survey of published opinions from various tribal courts 
found that "despite serious financial constraints, tribal courts have been no less protective of 
civil  rights than have federal courts ." McCarthy, supra note 1 1 9 ,  at 489. A student note that 
surveyed tribal court opinions from a number of tribes concluded that the tribal courts in 
question tend to enforce due process protections and that those courts ' conceptions of due 
process are s imilar, in many respects, to non-tribal due process notions. The student also noted 
some differences : For example, the tribal courts evinced a greater acceptance of the use of 
informal procedures in some instances. See Christian M .  Freitag, Putting Martinez to the Test: 
Tribal Court Disposition of Due Process, 72 IND. L.J. 83 1 ,  864 ( 1 997). 
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articulation of civil  rights or other requirements by a tribal court (rather than 
a state or federal court) may be received by tribal members as a more 
authoritative statement of the law, thus promoting comp liance?2 1 Such 
suits may foster the development of c ivil rights protections under tribal law, 
in cases where tribal law and the ICRA provide alternative bases for relief. 
In addition, channeling suits against tribal government to tribal courts 
furthers tribal autonomy; as one commentator has noted, "[p J ersistent suits 
in state and federal courts over routine tribal decisions could unduly 
interfere with tribal government and thus defeat the federal pol icy of Indian 
self-determination. , ,222 Although tribal-court j udgments that provide relief 
against tribal government defendants might also be seen as interfering with 
the conduct of tribal government, decisions by tribal courts are more likely 
to provide accurate results in cases where the determination of  the c laim 
depends on analysis of tribal law or factual circumstances specific to the 'b 7 7 3  tn e .--
It appears l ikely that tr ihal -court enforcement of ICRA prO\·islOI1S has s trengthened 
considerably in recent years; some ear l i er assessments tended to be more critical of tribal-court 
performance .  C i ting eight examples ranging from 1 9 69 through 1 9 85 ,  one commentator 
suggested that tribes in  genera l ,  and tribal courts in particul ar, had fa iled to appropriately 
enforce the ICRA's prov ision s . See Kevin 1 .  Worthen, Shedding Nell '  L ight on 0 1 7  Old Debate: 
..I Federal Indian Law Perspective on Congressional A uthority to L imit Fcderal Question 
Jurisdiction, 75 MINN. L. REV. 65,  1 0 1 -03 & 11. 1 68 ,  1 1 1- 1 2  nn. 209 & 2 1 1 ( 1 990). S imilarly, 
Frank Pommersheim and Terry Pechota, writing in 1 986, stated that they were "not aware of a 
single successful ICRA action brought by an Indian plaintiff in any of the triba l courts of South 
Dakota" and that such cases "are a lmost always deterred political ly or successfu l ly defended on 
the bas is of sovere ign immuni ty ." Frank Pommersheim & Terry Pechota, Tribal immunity, 
Tribal Cuurts, and the Federal SjJstem: Emerging Contours and Frontiers, 3 1  S . D .  L .  REV. 5 5 3 ,  
578 & n . 1 63 ( 1 986) .  
22 1 .  Stephen Cornel l  and Joseph Kalt have made an analogous point concerning the 
importance of the "fit" of a tribal governmental stnlcture wi th prior tribal traditions. In their 
snldy of tribal economic development, Cornell and Kalt found that certa in governmental 
s tructures-namely, structures that provided checks and balances and that promoted responsible 
behavior by tribal government-were associated with h igher rates of economic success. See 
Cornel l  & Kal t ,  supra note 1 8 0 ,  at 1 64 ( , , [E]!Icctive inst itutions entai l  devices for limiting the 
power of the individuals in con trol of the apparatus of govel11men t at any particular t ime."). 
Importantly, however, they also argued that th is  was tme only  when the govel11mental stmcture 
had a good "fit" wi th the tribe ' s  tradi tions. See id. at 272-73 (noti ng that when tribal resources 
and govel11ment form� are heJd constant, "there remain sharp differences in tribal economic 
performance" among tribes, and theorizing that "such differences arise as a result of  mismatches 
between i ndigenous tribal sociopolitical norms regarding the location, scope, source ,  and 
stnlcture of pol itical authority . . .  and the (imp osed) formal institutions of tribal government"). 
Thus, Cornell and Kalt suggest that policymakers should adapt govel11mental stnlctures to fit 
the specifics of the particular tribe .  See id. at 290. 
222. Note, supra note 1 8 1 ,  at 1 07 1 .  
223 . See Pommersheim & Pechota, supra note 220, at 5 77 ("Tribal judicial mechan isms 
wil l  be more sensitive to the traditional, cultural considerations that are o ften intertwined with 
the resolution of reservation disputes."); Note, supra note 1 8 1 ,  at 1 077  (noting that when a non-
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A predictable obj ection to tribal-court adjudication of  c laims against 
tribal governments is that a tribal court may lack the power or inclination to 
nlle against tribal government defendants. The history and current 
framework of state and federal government waivers of immunity be l ie the 
notion that a sovereign ' s  courts wi l l  necessarily be impermissibly biased: 
Both the federal government and the states have chosen to waive immunity 
only in their own courts, and, in many instances,  only in courts special ly 
designated for the purpose of hearing c laims against the government. 
A related, but distinct, misgiving might arise from the concern that 
obliging tribal courts to hear claims against triba l  governments could 
actually weaken those courts by creating s ituations in which other tribal 
government entities might disregard a tribal-court judgment. V icki Jackson 
has suggested that federal sovereign immunity doctrine may have devel oped 
in  part to "protect[] courts from losing in confrontations with the political 
branches . , ,224 However, as Professor Jackson points out, the provision of 
judicial remedies to those harmed by government action should strengthen, 
1 10t  weaken, judicial legitimacy.
225 In  addition, even if tribal government 
defendants might wish to avoid the i mposition of l iabil ity by tribal courts, 
they may be more wil l ing to subm it to that l iabil i ty if  they perce ive the 
al ternative to be a threat of congressional abrogation of tribal immunity in 
non-triba l  courts . 
Recent data suggest that tribal courts have developed significantly in 
the past thirty years, in terms of their numbers , their  staffing, their 
experience and their independence .226 Frank Pommersheim has noted the 
tr ibal court adjudicates "matters involv i ng t r ibal disputes and tribal law.  the risk of 
mis in terpretation and mistake i s  even greater than when a federal court in terprets state law, 
because such courts may have l imi ted knowledge of a reservation ' s  condit ions and needs"). 
224. See Jackson, supra n ote 85,  at 575-76.  
225 See id. at 607-08 ("[T]he legiti macy of courts can be re inforced by confronting the 
government and affording ind i v idua l  re l ief to those with leg i tima te c l a ims against the 
governmen t. " ) .  
2 26. See, e.g. , McCarthy, supm nOle 1 1 9 ,  a t  486  ("There has been a tremendous �volLl t i o n  
i n  tribal court  practice in the years s ince  t h e  passage of the ICRA ."); RODERT N .  CU"iTON ET 
.'\ 1 . . ,  AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 343  (4th Ed.  2003) (noting "a growing trend in Indian c o untry 
favoring greater separation of powers") .  The A I LC Survey provides some data that may shed 
light on judicial independence in some tribal court systems, but the low survey response rate 
and ambigui ties in the questions prec lude the concl usion that the survey results present an 
accurate p ic ture. See supra note 1 46 .  I n  particular, the survey' s  self-selection bias may wel l  
have skewed the responses concerning judicial independence: If, as Cornell and Kalt  argue,  
tribes with government structures that promote governmental accountab i l i ty are more l ikely to 
succeed economically, see supra note 221, and if, as  suggested in note 1 46, economically 
successful tribes may have been d isproportionately deterred fro m  responding to the survey, then 
one might expect the survey results to reflect a disproportionately low level of j udicial 
independence re lative to all tr ibal governments .  
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"possibilities for confrontation and governmental crisis" that may arise 
when tribal courts "rule  against other branches or parts of tribal 
government," but he points out that tribal courts can respond effectively to 
such issues by using "compel ling legal analysi s  and cultural referents to 
demonstrate that the decisions comport with both app licable law and 
cultural standards . ,,227 A recent analysi s  of tribal-court opinions conc luded 
that "the publ i shed cases would seem to indicate that tribal courts general ly 
prevail i n  clashes with triba l  councils over interpretation and enforcement 
of the ICRA and triba l l aw. , ,228 
A number of structural measures , such as the formation of i ntertriba l  
courts of appeals ,  can further guarantee the independence of  judicial 
dec isions?29 Increased federal funding is also key: Many tribes need 
financial help with thei r  efforts to develop their courts and broaden 
remedies for governmental actions. 23o The American Indian Law Center' s 
recent survey of tri ba l  courts, though l imited by its low response rate ,
23 l is  
suggestive in  th is regard . Among the seventy tribes that responded to the 
rel evant quest ion, the mean annual operat ing budget for tribal just ice 
systems was S 1 8  l . 800 and the median annual operating budget was 
In response to a question asking under what c ircumstances "[a] judge may be removed from 
office prior to his/her term expir ing," fifty-nine respondents stated that remova l could occur "for 
cause spec i fied in tribal legislation or contract," twelve respondents stated that removal could 
occur "at the di scretion of the tribal council, tribal chairperson or tribal administrator," and 
twelve respondents stated that removal could occur for "other" reasons.  AILC SURVEY, sl Ipra 
note 1 46 ,  app. D at 4 1 .  In response to the question "Does the tribal counc i l  or any other body 
othcr than a forlllally designated appellate court have the power to review court decis ions')" , 
seventy respondents answered "No" and sixteen respondents answered "Yes ." ld. The fol low­
up quest ion asked, "If no, has the tribal counci l or cha irperson reversed a court dec ision in a 
particular case (other than changing the law) outs ide the prescribed appellate process?"; s ixty­
two respondents answercd "No" and two respondents answered "Yes. "  ld. In response to the 
question "Has a j udge been removed from office after he or she has i ssued a controvers ia l  
dec ision?", seventy-six respondents answered "No" and n ine respondents answered "Yes ."  ld. , 
apr. 0 at 42 The affi rmat ive answers to the l as t  two questions do not indicate when s Llch 
inc idents occurred; it would be useful to know, for examp le ,  whether they occurred recen t l y or 
decades ago. A l so, the l ast question was ambiguous in that it d id  not spec ify the t iming of 
removal (prior to, or at ,  the expiration of the judge ' s  term?) and did not spec ify whether it was 
asking only about i nst'.lnccs in which there was a c lear causal l ink between the controversial 
decis ion and the removal. 
227 .  Pommersheim, supra note 1 32 ,  at 1 4- 1 5 .  
228 .  McCarthy, supra note 1 1 9, at 493 . 
229 .  I n  the AILC Survey, 27  respondents reported that an intertribal court of appeals 
provided the ir tribe w ith "judicial panels to hear appeals." AILC SURVEY, supra note 1 46,  app .  
D at 44. 
230. See McCarthy, supra note 1 1 9, at 5 1 3 (noting that "tribal courts are desperately 
underfunded"). 
23 1 .  See supra note 1 46 (discussing limitations of the survey data). 
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$ 1 22,000.232 Congress-recogn izing the need for increased funding­
enacted legislation in 1 993 and again in 2000 to augment federal financial 
support for tribal court systems, but it has failed to appropriate money to 
fund that legislation.233  
VI .  CONCLUSION 
A survey of sovereign immunity-tribal and otherwise-illustrates that 
the role of courts in holding government accountab le has changed over 
time. Over the past thirty years , tribes have strength ened their court 
systems and have increased the availabi lity of remedies against tribal 
governments .  Tribes have a strong incentive to continue the expansion of 
such remedies in order to retain the governmental authority stil l  accorded to 
them under federal law. The federal government has a responsibility to 
assist the tribes in  undertaking these developments by strengthening tribal 
courts , supporting the development of tribal economies, and continuing to 
affirm tribal govemmental  authority .  
Tribal immunity ' s  doctrinal pedigree has protected i t ,  for the moment, 
from Supreme Court encroachment; but that pedigree does not prove that 
immunity is normatively desi rable and it does not prec lude congressional 
abrogation. The fate of tribal sovereign immunity will rest, not with 
doctrine, but with Congress and with the tribes themselves.  The increasing 
avai labi lity of tribal-court remedies against triba l  enti ti es might wel l escape 
the notice of the Supreme Court, which lacks the resources, and perhaps the 
232 .  See AILC SURVEY.  sl ipra note 1 46, at 2 5 ;  id app. 0 at 49. These figures are even 
more striking in the l ight of the fact  that for some of the re spond ing tribes, the tribal j ustice 
system budget inc ludes not only funding for court personnel and court fac i l i t ies but also fund ing 
for other j ust ice-related personnel such as  prosecutors and probation officers. See id. a t  25 :  id. 
app. D at 46--48 .  
233 .  See Indian Triba l  Justice Act of  1 99 3 ,  Pub. L .  No. 1 0 3 - 1 76,  1 0 7 Stat . 2004 (cod ified a s  
amended at 25 LJ .S .c .  ��  3 60 1 -363 1 (2000); Ind ian Tri bJI  Ju sl ice T .:chn ica l  and Leg�ll 
Ass istance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 1 06-5 5 9 ,  1 1 4 Sta t . 2 7 7 '1'  (cod i fied i l l  scattered sec t i on s  of 
25 U.s.c.) .  As one commen tator noted in 200 1 ,  
The I ndian Tribal Justice Act and the December 2000 Indian Tribal 
Justice Technical  and Legal Assistance Act both remain unfunded. Al ready 
S58 .4 m i l l ion per year over the past six years should have been requested by 
the BIA to improve tribal j ustice systems. Instead, a l l  tribal justice systems 
(254 Indian court systems in aU) exist on S 1 2  to S 1 4  m i l l i on annua l ly. That 
amounts to $48,000 per court system-far short of what it takes to nm an 
effective state court system. 
Larry EchoHawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: Is the Guardian Keeping in Mind the 
Seventh Generation?,  5 N.Y.U.  J. LEGIS .  & PUB. POL 'y 83,  1 24-25 (200 1 -02);  see also Tom 
Tso, Indian Nations and the Human Right to an Independent Judiciary, 3 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 
1 05 , 1 1 2 ( 1 998)  (discussing the need for federal funding of tribal courts) .  
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incl ination, to investigate the rich variation in  tribal judicial remedies and 
proceedings. Congress, however, has the capacity to gather data on the 
development of tribal governments ; if the political impetus to abrogate 
tribal immunity resurfaces , it is to be hoped that Congress wil l  make use of 
that capacity and wil l  not abrogate tribal immunity from suit in non-tribal 
court in instances where tribes provide appropriate remedies in their own 
courts . 
